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ABSTRACT
The central question of this dissertation is “W hat conception o f the role of the 
nurse, and of the nurse-patient relationship, will result in the most effective 
w ay to attain the moral aims of nursing - the provision of hum ane, respectful 
and dignified care?” The background of current pre-occupations in nursing 
ethics is sketched out in a review o f the literature. Against this, the 
conceptions of the nurse as servant, advocate and skilled companion; and 
models o f the relationship as contractual, covenantal and dialogic are 
respectively examined. Relevant aspects of the peculiar position of the nurse 
are also exam ined; the invisibility of nursing, the potential for informal 
power, and the pivotal nature of the position. Empirical evidence from  both 
ethical and sociological studies is drawn upon to support the discussion. The 
conclusion arrived at is that, in the current UK health care system , the role of 
skilled com panion affords the nurse the greatest opportunity to achieve the 
moral aims o f nursing. It is tentatively suggested that understanding the 
nurse-patient relationship as dialogic may also be useful in the attem pt to 
realise these aims. Finally, the implications for nursing, and for nursing 
ethics, are outlined.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Origins of the Research Question
It is clear that the woman who shaped modem day nursing, Florence Nightingale, and 
whose name epitomises nursing for most people, saw nursing practice as 
fundamentally moral in nature, rather than scientific. (Abel-Smith 1960). Gadow 
(1979) points out that the principal elements in nursing are persons, so human values 
are by definition central. In common with other professions who serve people, there 
is no aspect of practice without ethical considerations.
The dominant sense of nursing has to date been moral and personal, rather than 
technical and professional. (Bishop and Scudder 1990). There is a general idea in 
society, and even among nurses, that moral issues and problems in nursing practice 
arise from the development of technology, and are related to issues of life and death. 
But moral issues and problems can arise from the practice of nursing itself: where, for 
example, the vulnerability and dependence of those requiring nursing care can lead to 
imbalances of power within the nurse-patient relationship.
Nursing has been referred to as an ethical enterprise (Allmark 1992). This statement 
can of course be challenged: nursing can be viewed in a variety of ways - a group of 
cognitive, affective and psychomotor tasks, a collective experience, an organisation, 
an abstract tradition. But these are simply ways of viewing the activity called nursing; 
none of them describe the foundation on which all these accounts are built. (Yarling 
and McElmurry, 1986). It is the original moral commitment to health and welfare that 
creates the profession, not the profession which creates the ethic. (Pellegrino 1985). 
Fry has claimed that, if there is a distinct nursing ethic, it derives from the nurse- 
patient relationship: the moral foundation for nursing. (Fry 1989).
Until very recently in this country, nurses saw themselves as ‘handmaidens’ to the
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physician. (Indeed current television drama suggests that this image lingers in the 
public mind, and personal clinical experience suggests in that of some nurses). This 
image, with its connotations of the virtues of obedience, self effacement and so on will 
be discussed in Chapter 3. Over the last 20 to 30 years, nurses have become more 
educated and nursing now lays claim to being a profession. Nurses have also become 
much more politically aware, and claim partnership with, rather than subservience to, 
physicians. A more recent trend is toward adopting the role of ‘advocate’ to the 
patient. The UKCC for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting have explicitly 
recommended this role to nurses in the Code of Conduct, a guide for professional 
practice issued to all nurses on the UK register. (UKCC 1992). The adoption of this 
role will also be discussed in Chapter 3.
The Research Question
Gadow in 1979 saw that the most pressing and most fundamental ethical question for 
nurses was the question of what might be the ideal relation of nurse to client. Almost 
twenty years later the profession does not appear to have agreed on what this might 
be. Gow (1982) saw a specific role for the nurse as a humanistic expressive specialist 
- concerned with maintaining humanity in an increasingly technological health service. 
Muyskens (1982) sees the function of the nurse as providing a human dimension to 
technical medical care, ensuring dignity and respect in the face of both illness and 
technology. From these sources, I have derived the question which I have taken to be 
central to this dissertation:
“What conception of the role of the nurse, and of the nurse-patient relationship, will 
result in the most effective way to attain the moral aims of nursing - the provision of 
humane, respectful and dignified care?”
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The Research Method
Philosophical Inquiry
Nursing has no identifiable philosophy in the way that education and medicine have. 
There are a variety of possibilities as to why this should be so: firstly, perhaps nursing 
and medicine share a common philosophy; secondly the phrase ‘philosophy of 
nursing’ is much misused in nursing to represent an ideology (Schrock 1981), which 
may obscure the lack of development of a true philosophy; and thirdly nurses have 
embraced the natural sciences with great fervour in their attempts to ‘professionalise’ 
nursing. ‘While the titillating allure of clean scientific answers continues to excite 
nurses, the profession is inexorably drawn toward the hazier study of human 
experience’ (Brunt 1985 p 17).
The questions traditionally answered by philosophy are the fundamental ones of 
being, of knowing and of values. Questions such as ‘what is nursing?’ ‘what is the 
foundation of the nurse-patient relationship?’ are not amenable to answer by the data 
or theories of science. (Ellis 1983). ‘You cannot prove that empathy is useful through 
sophisticated statistical analysis; you do not have to’. (Brunt 1985 p 18). This is not 
to say of course that data acquired from scientific study is not useful in contributing to 
the answer of these questions.
The goals of nursing are the health and welfare of human beings. These are moral 
goals, i.e. the seeking of good. Therefore philosophical inquiry is needed to clarify 
the means and ends of nursing (Ellis 1983), to contribute to the understanding of the 
moral fabric i.e. common values and varying perspectives, (if any) which holds the 
profession together and to answer the question ‘what gives meaning to what nurses 
are, and what they do?’ (Davis 1987).
Gaut (1985) describes the philosophical task as assessing and systematically relating 
‘from some integrating perspective the diversity of human knowledge and experience’ 
(p 73). Ellis (1983) suggests that philosophical techniques of analysis can be used to
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improve the understanding of important human endeavours. It is the latter aspiration 
to which this dissertation will attempt to contribute.
EmpiricalData
Jameton and Fowler (1989) describe dual mode research where descriptive and 
evaluative components are combined in the form of empirically obtained data and 
philosophical analysis. It is assumed that empirical work can help in the discovery of 
important moral considerations, even if the work does not establish the truth of 
fundamental moral principles. For example, Hutchinson’s work on rule bending 
among nursing (Hutchinson, 1990) or Goodwin et al’s work on placebo 
administration (Goodwin et al 1979) can contribute to a philosophical discussion of 
the moral concerns of nursing, even though these have been undertaken as 
sociological studies. Some philosophers have also carried out qualitative research; for 
example Davis and Jameton’s study of nurses views on autonomy, (Davis and 
Jameton 1987) and SelFs study of the ethical foundations of nurses’ decision making 
(Self 1987). Appropriate empirical evidence can be obtained for subsequent 
philosophical analysis of the moral claims of the profession. (Jameton and Fowler 
1989).
It is the contention of Martin Johnson (1990) that the current sources of data (medical 
and legal opinion and studies using limited experimental methods) are insufficient as a 
basis for moral debate. Naturalistic sociological methods have considerable potential 
to provide data and theories from which to describe and explain moral conduct in 
nursing.
It is with this view of the usefulness of combining empirical data, and philosophical 
inquiry, that this dissertation has been constructed. Selected empirical work will be 
drawn upon in order to identify the moral concerns of nurses, and the ways in which 
they deal with them. These studies have been selected on the following criteria: they 
examine aspects of everyday nursing practice which are seldom, or poorly, articulated 
and they do not necessarily focus on what are designated as ‘ethical’ issues. Often
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they are classed as sociological studies, but the data revealed cast light on moral 
aspects of nursing. They employ qualitative methods of inquiry. The literature 
suggests that these are appropriate methods for examining everyday work, which are 
open ended and suited to complexity, opening up possibilities of identifying 
conceptual orientations other than pre-conceived ones. (Gaut 1985).
Evidence drawn from these will be related to the discussion of the various conceptions 
of the nurse’s role, and those of the nurse-patient relationship.
I have been influenced in my approach to this study by Brody (1990), who outlines 
criteria for quality scholarship in ethics. These are: empirical research identifying 
moral problems which are not well discussed; exploration of context and institutional 
factors, and sensitivity to the problem of multiple moral traditions. His concept of 
reflective equilibrium allows one to put all this together - moving between empirical 
observation and reflective thought. I have tried, in a limited way, to use these criteria 
to achieve quality in this work.
Scope of Dissertation
I have attempted to set the discussion in context by providing a literature review which 
broadly reflects the current preoccupations of nurses studying the ethical concerns of 
nurses. This provides a background against which the central question is asked, and 
possible answers explored. The discussion then moves on to how the context in 
which the nurse practices affects these answers. The dissertation concludes with a 
brief summary, and an appraisal of what has been achieved.
Limits of the Dissertation
Throughout this dissertation, the emphasis will be placed, not on moral reasoning or 
making decisions in moral dilemmas, but on acting morally in the course of everyday 
practice; what Benner calls ‘ skilled moral comportment’ (Benner 1991). Empirical 
studies in nursing have repeatedly demonstrated that moral reasoning is not linked to
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moral behaviour (Ketefian 1989), so the substantial body of work dealing with moral 
reasoning processes in nurses will not be referred to.
The area of nursing considered will be that of acute physical illness. This has been 
selected because the writer’s clinical background, and most of the empirical studies, 
are located within this area. It is acknowledged that there may be aspects of nursing in 
other areas which are not therefore addressed here.
When referring to nurse/physician/patient, I have arbitrarily used the feminine gender 
throughout. I have used the word physician to indicate any member of the medical 
profession. I have used the word patient, rather than client, in the light of the context 
of acute physical illness. The meaning of the word ‘client’ does not seem to me to 
express accurately the position of the person who comes to the care of the nurse in an 
unsought relationship, where she is sick and distressed.
Although this dissertation addresses the situation of the British nurse, a substantial 
amount of the literature drawn upon is North American in origin. This is taken to be 
valid and appropriate, given the assumed nature of nursing, and the common history 
of both cultures.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Contemporary Bioethics
Two centuries ago, the mediaeval idea of morality stemming from an authoritative 
external source gave way to the idea that morality could be understood as deriving 
from human self governance. The work of the philosophers Kant and Bentham 
provided the springboard for the development of this notion. (Schnweewind,
1991).The ideal of the autonomous individual as the moral agent became the focus; 
and this has been elaborated and defended over the last two centuries. Moral 
behaviour, from this perspective, is based on rationality, and in particular critically 
reflective or reasoned abstract principles of conduct. Moral problems are viewed in 
terms of abstract rights, duties and principles of conduct. The ‘best’ answer to a 
moral problem is found by appealing to universal moral principles (Johnstone, 1989). 
This rationalistic approach has dominated philosophy over the last two hundred years, 
and is a feature of differing philosophical approaches, such as utilitarianism and 
Kantian deontology.
This contemporary perspective is reflected in current bioethical literature, which is 
dominated by a principle based ethical model. This is described by Beauchamp and 
Childress (1989). The model relies on a framework of ethical principles, which are 
considered to operate on a prima facie basis. The model describes and guides the 
actions of the moral agent. Moral choice involves the consideration of competing 
principles. Reason provides the means of deciding between these: presenting and 
defending reasons for action, assessing own assumptions and commitments and 
anticipating and responding to objections. The viewpoint of the moral agent is one of 
objectivity, impartiality and detachment. Rights, duties and obligations are viewed as 
being shared by all, and all are governed by rules, norms and principles. Different 
types of ethical theory may be invoked during this process.
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Challenges to Current Bioethical Stances
In the last 20 or so years, philosophers have begun to move away from this 
perspective. There are indications of a retreat from abstract principles, and a return to 
seeing morality as a matter of virtue. (MacIntyre, 1985). There is also a trend toward 
focusing attention on the behaviour of groups/communities, rather than the individual; 
and toward the consideration of specific problems such as managing the environment. 
(Schneewind, 1991).
The adequacy of contemporary philosophy has been challenged by philosophers such 
as Williams (1972; 1985), Blum (1980) and MacIntyre (1985). According to 
Williams, the unprecedented demands of the modem world cannot be met by 
conventional ideas of rationality. He challenges the primacy of rationality, and the 
decontextualisation of the individual. Blum argues that if emotionally based actions 
are appropriate behaviour within relationships, then philosophies grounded in rational 
principles only will be defective. MacIntyre sees in contemporary moral philosophy an 
array of conflicting moralities, which offer no guide to choosing between them, 
rejecting rationality and the emphasis on the individual in favour of a return to an 
Aristotelian notion of the virtues. In this view, the emphasis is on the nature of the 
moral agent, not on the moral action itself, or of its consequences. (Hursthouse 1987).
The feminist philosophers also have challenged contemporary philosophies. (Belenky 
et al, 1986; Baier, 1987; Benhabib, 1987; Held, 1987). Feminist moral theory holds 
that a substantive moral ethic should be grounded in the particular situations of 
experienced life, and not the detached hypothetical circumstances of the ideal. The 
contemporary idea of the individual agent is also brought into question (Meyers 1987). 
Moral philosophy has tended to neglect the areas of relationships and emotions, and 
has significantly neglected the phenomena of caring, concern and compassion. The 
ideal stance is that of a detached and impartial spectator. Feminist theorists challenge 
this. They see moral problems as constructed in terms of care, responsibility and 
personal relationships, not in terms of abstract rules and principles. They claim that 
currently accepted ethics have become principled at the expense of care.
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The work of Carol Gilligan, in generating a challenge to orthodox theories of moral 
development, also challenges the dominance of currrently accepted ethical theory, and 
reflects the philosophical trend away from the dominance of the individual (Gilligan 
1981,1982,1986). Gilligan challenged Kohlberg’s widely accepted theory of moral 
development on the basis that his empirical research was carried out on young males. 
When the conclusions drawn from this were applied to young females, they were 
categorised as being less morally developed than males. Based on her analysis and 
interpretation of this research, Gilligan claimed that there is a tendency on the part of 
males to a ‘justice’ (i.e. impartial and objective) orientation of morality; whereas there 
is a tendency on the part of females to a ‘care’ (i.e. involved and subjective) 
orientation of morality. The conclusion to be drawn therefore from Kohlberg’s work 
is not that women are morally deficient, but are differently orientated. Kohlberg has 
now accepted some of Gilligan’s claims and subsequently modified his theory in the 
light of these. (Kohlberg et al 1983). Gilligan’s work has been highly influential, and 
there has been considerable work carried out developing this thinking. (Lyons, 1983; 
Adler, 1987; Sher, 1987; Gilligan and Wiggins, 1988; Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988).
The controversies within contemporary philosophy described above are also beginning 
to be reflected in the literature of health care ethics. The principle based framework 
described by Beauchamp and Childress (1989) is not universally accepted in the field 
of bioethics and recently has begun to attract considerable criticism. A whole issue of 
the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy was devoted to this criticism in 1990,
(Clouser and Gert; Green; Holmes, 1990). Clouser and Gert (1990) criticise 
bioethical principles as conflicting, lacking systematic relationships to each other, and 
being unable to guide actions. They claim that it is impossible to integrate these 
principles as there is no theory to establish their validity and interrelationships, or 
guide their use. It seems therefore optimistic to expect individual practitioners to 
achieve something which some philosophers feel unable to do. Other criticisms of the 
current principle focused approach are that moral wisdom is needed, and consideration 
of the principles does not provide this (Holmes 1990) and that there is a heavy reliance 
on simply applying received principles. (Green 1990). In addition, contextual
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factors, like relationships, may be overlooked, or perhaps more likely, incorporated 
tacitly into the reasoning process. Those who criticise the principled approach vary in 
their responses from suggesting it be abandoned, to increasing work on these in order 
to develop a unifying theory. However, not only the principle based approach has 
come under attack: so too has the traditional impartial and objective perspective.
Emergence o f an Ethic o f Care
Carse (1991) summarises the chief criticisms levelled against the justice orientation by 
Gilligan and other care theorists. From a justice perspective, commitment to 
impartiality is the moral stance. This captures our intuition that what is morally 
required of one individual is required of everyone. But, because the agent’s view of 
the ‘person’ is an abstract one, this from the care perspective is seen as a moral 
problem because it is devoid of consideration of both the distinctive identity of the 
person, and the relationship between the agent and the person. The danger is that the 
agent may become unable to perceive, imagine, and therefore understand the other’s 
position.The rejection of impartiality, or detachment as Gilligan refers to it, as a moral 
viewpoint reflects a withdrawal from contemporary tendencies to rely on forms of 
judgment that take no account of specific situations and people, and see moral maturity 
and skill as a capacity for abstract deliberation.
Secondly, the care orientation is characterised by a view of moral principles as being 
insufficient to guide moral actions. The application of principles to specific cases does 
not give a complete description of how we interpret situations and decide how to act. 
The agent has to a) recognise that the principle is relevant to a particular situation and 
b) realise how to act in order to apply the principle. This requires a capacity for 
perception not addressed by the principles themselves. There is no room in principle 
based ethics for sensitivity to other people, and for the capacity to perceive emotion. 
Gilligan argues that this ‘attentiveness’ is in itself a moral capacity which can be 
developed, and it is not principle governed.
Thirdly, from the traditional, justice perspective, emotions are viewed as hindering
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judgment. But emotions play a crucial role in drawing attention to the morally relevant 
aspects of a situation. Emotion also plays an important part in moral actions; it is not 
only what we do but how we do it that makes an action moral.
The emphasis on impartial principles and dispassionate judgment which is a key 
feature of the traditional orientation may not provide adequate guidance in an ethic 
which specifically takes care as its focus. Deliberating on and upholding principles 
does not necessarily generate a caring response to others.
In Carse’s analysis the differences between the two perspectives are not just those of 
emphasis; but relate to moral judgment, the nature of the moral agent, and our 
responsibilities as individuals to each other. For example, the care ethic emphasises 
compassion toward specific individuals, the traditional ethic emphasises an abstract 
love of humanity. (Carse, 1991). It should be emphasised, however, that it is not 
suggested these are two completely different moralities; but simply two differing 
perspectives within morality. In the same way in which, as Wilson Bamett points out, 
(Wilson Bamett, 1994) the recent emphasis on rights in health care has served to 
address previous neglect, this recent emphasis on care, in my view, is serving to 
redress the balance, not replace justice. On the justice orientation, people are viewed 
first as individuals and secondly within relationships of individual choice. On the care 
orientation, people are understood essentially as being in, and deriving their meaning 
from, relationships.
Other writers have endorsed the idea of care as a moral attribute. Noddings (1984) 
gives a comprehensive account of an ethic of care, deriving her thoughts from ethical 
and social psychology theory. The ethic is rooted in relatedness, responsiveness and 
receptivity (which is closely related to Gilligan’s idea of ‘attentiveness’ outlined 
above). Ethical caring is the relation in which we meet another morally. Carers are 
guided not by ethical principles but by the strength of the ideal of caring itself.
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Criticisms o f  an Ethic o f Care
Clearly the challenges presented outlined above have not gone unanswered: 
considerable debate has been generated. (Hill, 1987; Montague, 1990; Almond,
1992). The gender dualism hinted at above is also currently strenuously debated. 
(Johnstone, 1989; Harbison, 1992; Gillon, 1992). ‘Male’ moral reasoning is 
described in terms of rational constructs and abstract moral principles; ‘female’ moral 
reasoning is described in terms of non rational constructs such as love and 
compassion. It is therefore very important to establish that there is no suggestion by 
any of the care theorists that women speak with a united moral voice, and that it is 
vital to reject any gender exclusivity or conflict that the language used may invite. As 
stated above, some male contemporary philosophers hold views in accordance with an 
ethic of care.
Neither of these perspectives therefore are correlated strictly with gender (Gandhi and 
Luther King for example possessed ideas consonant with the care ethic (Johnstone 
1982); some of Gilligan’s research was done with men as subjects (Gilligan and 
Poliak, 1988); neither are they are mutually exclusive. What is suggested is a new, 
combined ethic combining the moral perspectives of justice and care, each opening up 
possibilities for the other; and each constraining the dominance of the other. It is vital 
to insist that modem Western philosophy is not rejected, nor are principles, and the 
crucial importance of justice and rights is not denied. The demands of the care 
theorists are only that they be examined more thoroughly and applied more caringly.
As Carse (1991) points out, justice is not rendered unimportant in the care ethic; what 
is questioned is its sufficiency as a moral standard, and what is more virtually the sole 
standard. A more adequate, and fuller, moral theory could involve an integration of the 
justice and care orientations to retain their respective strengths. The strength of the 
justice perspective lies in the commitment to welfare, the questioning of assumptions, 
the refusal to be blinded by false ideas. The strength of the care perspective is the 
refusal of detachment and depersonalisation, an insistence on seeing and making 
connections between people and the insistence on attaching importance to
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responsibilities within relationships.
It could also be said that a danger of an ethic of care is that a reliance on compassion 
may interfere with judgment and prevent rational response. In addition, it could 
perhaps elicit an ideal of self sacrifice, over protection, or paternalism. There are two 
ways in which this objection could be answered. Firstly, by appealing to Aristotle. 
Implicit in the idea of a virtue, (assuming one accepts caring as a virtue, see below), is 
the notion that an integral part of possessing any virtue is knowing ‘the right level’ 
(Hursthouse 1987) at which to exercise it. Clearly there is a difficulty here in 
knowing when you have ‘got it right’ - one of the criticisms of virtue ethics is that 
there is no clear guide for action. However, some writers are now returning to the idea 
that guides to action are not enough, without the parallel development of moral 
wisdom. (Andre 1992). Secondly, if one is seeking to combine the strengths of a 
care based and a principle based ethic of justice, then the notion of respect for 
autonomy also serves to act as a constraint on this possibly harmful outcome. This 
demonstrates the role of principles in providing us with broad norms of conduct which 
act as a check on behaviour. (Carse 1991).
Nursing Ethics
It is clear from the texts reviewed on bioethics (Glover 1977; Campbell and Higgs 
1982; Campbell 1984a; Gillon 1985; Singer 1986; Hursthouse 1987; Beauchamp and 
Childress 1989; Charlesworth 1993) that the medical profession is, or has the potential 
to be, a major focus of attention. The issues which arise in bioethics are those which 
typically lead to decisions being made by physicians: for example, genetic 
manipulation, advances in reproductive technology, or dealing with the dying. 
Although many of these decisions are based on value, rather than technical, 
judgement, current society tends to look to the medical profession for answers, and 
are encouraged to do so. (Downie, 1984).1
It is a widely accepted tenet of biomedical ethics that physicians have a special ethic,
1 The case for the public to explicate common values and participate in medical value judgements is clearly 
outlined by Neuberger (1994).
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different from (at least in degree) that which binds other society members, because of 
the nature of their profession. (Sieghart, 1985). This assumption is accepted in this 
dissertation for the moment, although it should be acknowledged that this assumption 
has been challenged recently by Downie. (1986 a, b). He maintains that physicians 
(and presumably nurses) have no claim to any exclusive ethic, simply to that by which 
all members of society are bound. The existence of a specific professional ethic is a 
device to raise the status and increase the power of the profession. In this reading of 
the situation, if nurses seek to establish a nursing ethic, they are doing so in the 
interests of the profession, not of their patients. This point will be returned to in the 
concluding chapter. Writers such as Downie and Telfer (1969), Pellegrino and 
Tomasma (1981) and Campbell (1984b) explored and explicated their ideas of how a 
distinctive medical ethic could be described. Few writers have attempted to explicate a 
nursing ethic, Gadow in the USA being a notable exception. (Gadow 1983). Leaving 
aside the question of whether there is in fact a distinct nursing ethic, there is no doubt 
however that nurses have written a considerable literature on ethics as applied in 
nursing.
Nursing ethics is conventionally considered either as a subdivision of the bioethical 
model, of which the biomedical model is also a subdivision; or as a subdivision of 
biomedicine. (Veatch 1981), although this allocation has been challenged (Twomey, 
1989). Normative discussion of ethics in nursing is usually framed in the main by 
biomedical ethical principles, (Rumbold 1986; Melia 1989; Rowson 1990;
Chadwick and Tadd 1992; Thompson, Melia and Boyd, 1994; and codes of conduct 
and practice are based on these. (UKCC, 1992).
Beauchamp and Childress (1989), two of the best known writers in the field, clearly 
see both medicine and nursing as being part of the same overall bioethical picture. 
References to specific nursing preoccupations are few: reference to specific physician 
ones are many. The only area where nursing difficulties are addressed in detail is in 
relation to conflicts of fidelity. They identify nursing as the area where these conflicts 
are ‘the most pervasive and morally troubling’ (Beauchamp and Childress, p 347). 
They clearly identify the system within which nurses work and the role they occupy as
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factors influencing these conflicts, but believe nevertheless that all health care 
professionals share the same principles and follow the same rules. However, 
empirical work suggests that the two professions adopt different perspectives on the 
same situations, and have different preoccupations. (Goodwin et al 1979; Sheard 
1980; Uden et al 1992; Grundstein-Amado 1993). The question is whether these 
differences are sufficient to establish a separately derived set of rules and principles. 
This point will be returned to in the concluding chapter.
With regard to dealing with the ‘pervasive and morally troubling’ conflicts above, 
Beauchamp and Childress suggest that answers to these hinge on a general 
understanding of moral responsibility in nursing. Their discussion of this is brief, 
however, and relates mainly to the general trend in nursing from physician’s 
handmaiden toward patient advocacy as the major moral responsibility. They appear 
to be offering a model of radical advocacy as a contemporary understanding of the 
moral responsibility of the nurse, justified by invoking the principles of beneficence 
and autonomy. They do not acknowledge either the considerable difficulties facing 
nurses prepared to act in this way, or the arguments against nurses adopting this as a 
major responsibility, suggesting only that procedural solutions might facilitate the 
adoption of the role.
Backing up this discussion, Beauchamp and Childress have reviewed nurse writers 
from 1977 to 1987. The authors are all American, and influential and well known 
contributors to nursing literature. They appear to have focused on how these writers 
contribute to an understanding of the situations of moral conflict in which nurses find 
themselves, but do not refer to their attempts to explicate philosophies of nursing, or 
describe the moral behaviour of nurses.
Nursing is touched on only briefly elsewhere: once in relation to the controversy over 
decisions to withdraw feeding, citing nurses as possibly holding the view that food is 
an ordinary part of life, not a treatment which can be withdrawn. But they do not here 
refer to the peculiar problems of nurses caught in what Engelhardt (1985) refers to as 
the ‘in between’ position of nursing: having to implement feeding, or caring for the
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patient who has had feeding withdrawn. They offer no discussion of an appropriate 
role, if any, for nurses in making these decisions or how to deal with the moral 
distress which may occur in these situations.
Turning now to nursing texts, one might confidently expect that here the unique moral 
concerns of the nurse, if any, might be sought out and explored. In fact a survey of 
standard works in nursing ethics reveals little difference from the approach outlined 
above. Jameton (1984) for example sees nursing and medicine as similar health care 
professions, bioethics arising from the experience of both of these. His discussion is 
conducted in terms of principles and the major ethical theories. He conducts an 
analysis of a case of medical incompetence causing conflict with nursing staff, and his 
vivid discussion of this is consonant with Beauchamp and Childress’ treatment of 
conflicts of loyalty (discussed above). “Since urgent good and gruesome evil co-habit 
in hospitals, nurses work in ambiguity and contradiction. Since they do both good and 
bad things to patients, nurses ask themselves whether the enterprise as a whole 
justifies continuing co-operation with things that in their judgement are reprehensible
 the fact that someone else makes the decision underlying what they do does
not remove the feeling of complicity in wrongdoing”. (Jameton 1984, p 282). He 
cites as examples of this repeated heel stabs on babies who will not survive, or doctors 
refusing to take part in infection control precautions.
Bumard and Chapman (1988) discuss the ethical aspects of the code of professional 
conduct in terms of principles in very similar terms to those used by Beauchamp and 
Childress, and draw on the major ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism to 
inform their discussion.
Chadwick and Tadd (1992) take a similar approach, but offer a discussion of models 
of the nurse patient relationship. It is clear from the discussion that advocacy is the 
current major framework under consideration, and they discuss this in detail, outlining 
different classes of advocacy, and pointing out the limitations and drawbacks, as well 
as the perceived advantages. The concept of advocacy as a moral basis for nursing will 
be explored in Chapter 3.
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Davis and Aroskar (1978) lay out traditional ethical positions in relation to issues in 
nursing - notably consent, rights, abortion etc. They selectively introduce 
philosophers’ ideas they feel to be relevant to nursing - notably Rawls neo-Kantian 
justice based theory (Rawls, 1971) based within the rationalist tradition. 2
Other nursing texts follow much the same line, adapting case studies to fit nursing 
situations, and often drawing on common nursing experience. A recent publication by 
Wilson-Bamett (1994) advocates a principled rights and duties based perspective, and 
claims that the nature of the nurse patient relationship provides a context and 
perspective for application of these: in a similar way in which Gillon (1994) appears to 
refer to scope as providing the context for application in health care. She appears to 
endorse Campbell’s idea of skilled companionship, (discussed in Chapter 3), and 
Tschudin’s concepts of caring, (Tschudin 1992) believing that applying the principles 
will allow nurses to avoid the trap of sentimentality and emotional exploitation. She 
later suggests that the adoption of a covenantal model might be appropriately used in 
order to set acceptable limits on the giving involved in the relationship. She 
recognises a difference between nursing and medicine in what she describes as the 
context or responsibilities and therefore the nature of the dilemmas, and the possibly 
greater opportunity of the nurse to establish relationships: referring here for support to 
Oakley’s paper on the importance of the nurse. (Oakley 1984). Oakley, in a paper 
delivered to a World Health Organisation conference in Helsinki, analyses the
contribution of the nurse from a sociological perspective.^
Wilson-Bamett, I think correctly, points out that the recent emphasis on rights has 
been necessary within the health service to redress the problems of institutional, 
routinised and depersonalised care. She too refers to the current interest in nursing in
2 Theirs is the first instance I can find of a reference to what they call ‘the great informal power of 
the manipulative subordinate’ (Davis and Aroskar p 37). I shall return to this idea later in Chapter 5.
3 An interesting feature of Oakley’s paper is her acknowledgement that despite 15 years as a researcher 
in hospitals, she had not really noticed what nurses did. This idea of the ‘invisibility’ of nursing I 
shall return to later in Chapter 5.
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advocacy, and indirectly queries whether nurses are appropriate advocates. She 
claims that if autonomy were protected, advocacy would be irrelevant, but does not 
pursue this claim, or point out the difficulties in protecting autonomy from a nursing 
standpoint. Many of the criticisms levelled against the nurse as advocate could be 
applied to the nurse as protector of autonomy. She does endorse Johnstone’s 
argument against advocacy, (Johnstone 1989) and considers the fiduciary relationship 
a more appropriate basis for nursing, with the authority to care derived from trust.
Fundamental to the nurse patient relationship (or potential relationship) is the need to 
understand the patient’s experience. Wilson-Bamett discusses the necessity for 
communication and history taking skills in order to develop this relationship. She 
neglects however to mention quantities such as imagination and sensitivity - both one 
would imagine essential to understanding others experiences. The necessity to 
understand patient experience by listening to their stories is also seen as a fundamental 
moral requirement by the American nurses, Benner (1991) and Parker (1990).
Wilson-Bamett suggests that nurses, from their particular perspective, apply and 
integrate the accepted tenets of ethical thinking, i.e. a principle based framework. She 
does not however refer to the ongoing debate as to the adequacy of this outlined 
above. Additionally, the values derived from biomedical ethical principles have not 
been convincingly demonstrated to be the primary moral foundation of nursing ethics. 
Some studies (Akerlund and Norberg 1985; Hutchinson 1990; Webb and Bunting
1992) indicate that nurses violate ethical principles in practice. Biomedical ethics guide 
most normative discussions of ethics in nursing, but little account is taken of the role 
and social significance of nurses, the ideal of caring and other values for practice. (Fry 
1989). The bioethical framework, and the codes of practice based on it, may not 
accurately, therefore, represent the basis of nurses’ moral judgments and actions.
Contemporary Challenges Reflected in Nursing Literature
It has been said that nursing ethics cannot simply be the application of biomedical 
principles to a new set of facts. (Jameton, 1984). On the contrary, nursing ethics
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should describe the moral phenomena found in nursing practice, critically assess 
language and theoretical foundations of practice, and raise normative claims about the 
aims of practice (Fry, 1989). It is clear from the literature that there is a growing body 
of opinion that the bioethical/medical model, deriving from current philosophical 
stance, is inadequate for this purpose, and that a different, or at least expanded, 
model is required which is adequate.(Bishop and Scudder 1987; van Hooft 1990; 
Harbison 1992; Tschudin 1992).
The contemporary philosophical debate is reflected in nursing literature. For example, 
the notions of a return to Aristotelian rather than Kantian thinking have appealed to 
nurses. Their response varies from defending the importance of emotion and 
sensitivity, and their role in practical reasoning (van Hooft 1990), to advocating a 
virtue ethics as appropriate for discussing the moral concerns of nurses (Edgar 1993). 
There have been attempts to identify ‘caring’ as the central virtue of nursing (Brody 
1988; Knowlden 1990). This movement in the nursing literature has faint echoes in 
the medical literature. (Toon 1993). It is clear that the work of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1984) has influenced nurses. (Brody 1988, Edgar 1993). It is interesting therefore 
that when MacIntyre writes specifically about nursing, his concerns appear to have a 
different focus, (see chapter 3). However, critical responses to this enthusiasm can be 
found, in particular that of Salsberry (1992). She acknowledges the attractions of 
virtue theory to nurses, largely by providing a central place for the nurse-patient 
relationship as an internal good, and by acknowledging the moral value of emotions. 
However, there is a clear danger of decreasing self analysis - ‘I’m virtuous, so 1 don’t 
need to think’. She recommends that both duty and virtue be combined in the 
development of nursing ethics.
Gilligan’s work in delineating the ‘voice of care’ has also attracted interest from 
nurses. (Gilligan, 1982). This is not surprising given the parallel between women’s 
history, and nursing history. Nurses have taken up and applied Gilligan’s thinking to 
their work, seeing parallels between the male/female dichotomy in moral thinking 
revealed by Gilligan, and the doctor/nurse tensions in health care. (Cooper, 1989; 
Harbison, 1992). There has been considerable interest in using Gilligan’s ideas as a
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framework for research in nursing ethics, displacing the previous focus on the use of a 
Kohlbergian framework. (Huggins and Scalzi, 1988; Chally, 1990; Millette 1994).
In the USA there has also been considerable interest in what the feminist philosophers 
have to offer nursing, and a variety of nurses have applied the insights outlined 
previously to the work of nurses, clearly seeing nursing as ‘women’s work’; or at 
least work which has traditionally been the preserve of women. (Chinn and Wheeler 
1985; Neil and Watts 1991.)
A theme which runs through all these challenges is that of ‘care’. Since nursing is the 
major caring profession (World Health Organisation 1987), it has been proposed that a 
theory of nursing ethics should be based on an ethic of care. The ethic of caring could 
be the genuine core concept of the nursing discipline (Kurtz and Wang 1991), which 
separates nursing from other disciplines. The ethic of care is not focused on 
principles, but on needs and the responsibilities generated within relationships. 
Considerable interest in an ethic of care is a relatively recent development in nursing 
literature (Carper 1989; Fry 1989).
A distinctive work is that of the Australian nurse Johnstone. She also discusses 
principled and care based ethics, but a major concern is to point to the lack of nursing 
voice in bioethical debate, the lack of nursing perspectives in common texts, and 
voices the widespread belief that the nurse patient relationship is not morally 
significant. A considerable array of evidence, in the form of legal decisions and 
empirical studies, is marshalled in support of these claims. A particularly vivid 
example is that of a case where the moral distress of nurses caring for patients 
undergoing abortion was perceived in a study by physicians as evidence of either 
intellectual or professional inadequacy, or of psychiatric disturbance (Johnstone 1989 
p 230-236). She tries to answer the question of why the moral burden of nursing is 
ignored in terms of the history of the profession and gender issues in society. I 
would suggest that these are only two of the factors which contribute to the 
‘invisibility’ of nurses and nursing work, (see Chapter 5). In all, this work is a 
damning indictment of nursing apathy, and of the powerful influences denying 
nursing a moral voice. It is an Australian work, and draws heavily on that context.
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Johnstone refers to American work, and there is very little UK evidence. But nothing 
she says seems inappropriate to nursing experience in this country.
Caring in Nursing
The Compact Oxford Dictionary (1991) defines the verb ‘to care’ as “to feel concern, 
to trouble oneself, to feel interest”. To ‘care for’ is defined as “to take thought for, to 
provide for to look after; to have a regard or liking or inclination for”. ‘Not to care’ is 
defined as “not to mind, regard, pay attention or respect; be indifferent.” The implied 
definition of caring as ‘paying attention’ recalls Gilligan’s notion of ‘attentiveness’, 
which is regarded as a moral attribute. The dictionary definition suggests that caring is 
a phenonomenon which has at least two aspects; a practical one, and a moral one. 
Benner (1990) appears to suggest that these two are reconciled in the activity of 
nursing, and there is some empirical work which supports this (Lutzen and Norden
1993).
Caring as a phenomenon has lately been much discussed in nursing (Watson, 1979; 
Leininger 1981; Gadow, 1987; Benner and Wrubel 1989; Benner, 1990) There 
appears to be complete agreement that it is an important fundamental nursing value, 
but there appear to be different emphases in the varying treatments of the concept. 
Watson describes caring as a human value involving a will and commitment to care, 
knowledge, caring actions, and consequences. In this view, the value of caring is 
regarded, not as an operationalised aspect of nursing work, but as the ideal to which 
nurses aspire in their work. Benner (1990) states that the moral dimensions of caring 
require attention to the local and specific, the particular and the concrete, not the 
abstract and theoretical, just as the practical dimensions do. Care and responsibility 
within personal relationships are just as (not m ore) necessary to moral behaviour as 
abstract reasoning, autonomy and concern for equality. Benner clearly sees the 
necessity to augment current biomedical ethics with an ethic of care, and her 
discussion reflects the wider debate outlined above.
Notions of holism are evident: according to Carper (1989), caring involves being
21
concerned with the whole person, and practicing with consideration and sensitivity. 
Gadow (1987) goes so far as to argue that the value of caring provides a foundation 
for a nursing ethic, which will protect and enhance human dignity. In the UK, in a text 
which stands out from the standard nursing ethics texts, Verena Tschudin, (1992) 
although addressing the principle based frameworks, concentrates on the caring 
relationship. Caring is not seen as a detached and rational, principle bound activity, 
but as an area of feeling, protecting and communicating: emphasising the reciprocity of 
caring. It is not a selfless act, the carer receives as well as gives. She draws on work 
by Gilligan and Noddings associating gender roles with moral approaches, also 
referring to the current ‘justice vs. care’ debate in recent nursing literature.
She suggests that Niebuhr’s theory of responsibility is particularly appropriate for 
nurses. The question the moral agent asks here is not ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘What 
are the goals?’ but ‘What is happening here to which I should respond?’ This 
approach is consistent with that suggested by the recent advocates of an ethic of care 
for nursing. It is however difficult to see that the first two questions would not also 
be appropriate ones for the nurse to ask.
In common with Beauchamp and Childress she identifies most of the problems facing 
nurses as those of constraint and conflict in the ‘in between’ position. Some writers 
seem to suggest however that instead of this position being problematic, it has certain 
advantages: that this position is used to the patient’s advantage. (Yarling and 
McElmurry 1986; Bishop and Scudder 1990). I shall argue later that this view may be 
justified in light of the empirical evidence, but at some cost to nurses and others in the 
system.
The conclusion drawn by Kelly on the basis of empirical research in both the USA and 
UK, (Kelly 1990) is that both respect and caring are equally important, and that these 
are the essence of nursing. The notion of respect as a central value had already been 
elaborated on by Downie and Telfer in 1969, and it is interesting that this concept is 
explicated in empirical, but not theoretical, nursing research. Frankena (1983) in line 
with Kantian thinking, appears to equate respect for persons with caring. Also
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interestingly, Kelly’s definition of caring reflects an involved, subjective stance; the 
‘little, everyday things’ being seen by nurses as of considerable importance to the 
meaning of caring.
I have found only two philosophers who have attempted analyses of the concept 
caring: Griffin (1983) in the UK, and Fry (1990) in the USA. Griffin identifies both 
moral and non moral attributes of caring, acknowledges the emotional components of 
caring, and agrees with Gilligan that ‘attentiveness’, or sensitivity and perception to 
need is a key attribute. The ability to perceive and respond to needs is a moral ability; 
what nurses do is to translate this into practical and purposeful activities. For Griffin, 
this is in accord with Heidegger’s idea of ‘attunement’ and Iris Murdoch’s moral 
vision. Griffin, I think, is aware of the variety and complexity of the concept ‘caring’ 
when she says that nurses need to identify which concept of caring they should 
support; and stresses that this should be to the benefit of the patient.
Cooper (1991) suggests that the ability of the nurse to see the patient from two 
perspectives (justice and care) may induce a creative tension, by simultaneously 
generating compassion and broadening the nurse’s perspective, while focusing moral 
attention on the patient. However, she does not appear to consider the possibility that 
the tension created could be destructive, given the orientation of the medical profession 
to the justice perspective, and the traditional powerlessness of the nurse in working 
situations.
Fry (1990) reviews attributes and definitions of caring found in nursing literature, and 
groups these into a variety of models - cultural (exemplified in Leininger’s work 
(1981)); feminist (exemplified in Gilligan (1982) and Noddings’ (1984) work); and 
humanist, citing Watson (1979), a nurse; Pellegrino (1981), a physician; and 
Frankena (1983), a philosopher, as proponents of a humanistic model of caring. She 
suggests that elements of all of these are important in trying to think about nursing.
The movement toward an ethic of care has not gone unchallenged. As has been said, 
most writers clearly see the need for a synthesis of principled ethics and care ethics,
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realising that both perspectives have much to offer nurses. Even the critics of the care 
ethic advocate an integrated ideal. Among these are Kuhse and Olsen. Olsen points 
out that the ethic of care does not provide a guide which determines what contextual 
factors are legitimate ethical guides, and suggests ways of dealing with this, while 
avoiding a return to the decontextualised approach. (Olsen, 1993). He refers to the 
tradition of writing which tries to reconcile friendship obligations with the moral 
imperative to treat others equally, suggesting that these may offer insights to nurses. 
(Olsen 1992). Kuhse (1993) points out that adherence to an ethic of care may put 
nurses in a position where, as in previous generations, they are unable to credibly 
justify their moral actions, and those of others; since the ethic of care is unable to 
provide a guide and justification for action. Condon (1992) further points out that the 
ethics of caring have considerable potential for describing the one to one nurse patient 
relationship, but nurses have responsibilities to others not known personally to them. 
Recourse to an ethic of principles is therefore necessary. Olson (1993) refutes the 
claim that nursing is founded an a tradition of caring by studying nursing records from 
the first part of this century. The language used by nurses in relation to patient care is 
notable for images of manipulation and control, not of comfort and of care. 4
A Nursing Ethic
Nursing is widely held to be a ‘moral enterprise’. (Fry 1989, Benner 1990, Allmark
1992). According to Sarvimaki (1988), the basis of nursing consists of a set of 
values, and the nature of these values is moral. The values are concerned with the 
relation with others and how to behave to others: in their specialised situation nurses 
have a commitment to the vulnerable. The values derived from biomedical ethical 
principles have not convincingly been demonstrated to constitute the moral foundation 
of a nursing ethic: in fact empirical studies indicate that nurses violate these ethical 
principles in practice. (Akerlund and Norberg 1985; Hutchinson 1990; Webb and 
Bunting 1992). The biomedical framework therefore may not represent, therefore, 
the basis of nurses’ moral judgments and actions. It has also been claimed that the
4 It could be of course that the tradition of caring is drawn from a much earlier period of time; 
or it could be that the idea of caring is so internalised that it is not expressed in nursing 
records: i.e. taken for granted.
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foundations of nursing ethics are derived from the nature of the nurse-patient 
relationship, not from models of rights based autonomy, or social contract. The moral 
goals of nursing are met, or not met, within the nurse-patient transaction. (Curtin 
1978; Silva 1977; Fry, 1989).
Considerable debate has taken place in the literature exploring what the moral 
foundation of nursing might consist of. Opinions are diverse and the debate is often 
heated. It is claimed by some that nursing ethics should be viewed as reform (Yarling 
and McElmurry, 1986; Foulk and Keffer, 1991), or empowerment (van Hooft, 1990) 
ethics. Bishop and Scudder (1987) oppose the view of ethics as reform, claiming that 
the ‘in between’ unique position of the nurse should be the foundation of an ethic. 
Packard and Ferrara (1988) claim that we need a clearly developed understanding of 
the nature of nursing, before we can explicate an ethic. It is generally agreed 
however, despite the critics, that an important part of the basis of nursing is caring. 
This has generated the considerable attention to caring in nursing described above. 
Consideration of these views suggests that caring as an ethical and personal value 
might be the central key in setting normative guidelines for nurses attitudes and 
actions. If this is the case, and if caring is consistently reinforced as an ideal by those 
who have the responsibility of meeting the needs of others, then the charge to care is 
essentially a moral injunction. (Fry, 1989). Since society charges nurses with caring 
for the vulnerable, then the whole practice of nursing is a moral enterprise. However, 
caring is not exclusive to nurses: social workers, doctors, clergy and lay people may 
equally claim to care. This is not, of course, a problem unless it is being claimed that 
caring is the unique feature which distinguishes nursing from other activities: and that 
is claimed, or implied, in the nursing literature. (Rawnsley, 1990; Kurtz and Wang, 
1991; Pollack-Latham 1991). The World Health Organisation recognition of nursing 
as the major caring profession was not, I think, intended to imply that professional 
caring is unique to nursing, simply that nursing has the greatest contribution to make 
to professional caring. (World Health Organisation, 1987). What needs to be clarified 
is what, if anything, distinguishes caring in nursing. This will be discussed in the 
following chapters.
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Summary
The conclusion to be drawn from a scrutiny of the literature in nursing ethics over the 
past few years, is that there appears to be a trend: firstly from the principled, detached 
approach, which is reflected in virtually all standard medical and nursing texts, and in 
codes of practice; toward a more responsive, involved approach (Johnstone, 1989; 
Benner, 1990; Tschudin, 1992) and more lately toward a merging, or conciliation, of 
the two. (Gustafson 1990; Tschudin 1992; Melia, 1994; Wilson Barnett, 1994; 
Gallagher, 1995). Empirically, Cooper’s research (1990) analysing the moral 
experience of critical care nurses found that a justice perspective predominated in their 
thinking on their initial encounter with the patient; as the relationship developed so the 
nurses moved toward the language of care based ethics. This trend toward 
conciliation reflects developments in contemporary philosophy and moral 
developmental psychology. This of course leaves out the question of whether these 
two perspectives represent the full picture, or are there other perspectives as yet 
undescribed. This question is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3; THE ROLE OF THE NURSE
In answer to the central question “What conception of the role nurse will result in
the most effective way to attain the moral aims of nursing ?”, Muyskens (1982)
offers the concept of the nurse as advocate, as does Gadow (1990), although they 
appear to mean different things. The rest of this central chapter explores this image, 
with others, and an attempt to answer this question will be made in the concluding 
chapter.
The Traditional Concept o f The Nurse 
The Nurse as Handmaiden
For many years, nursing texts exhorted nurses to be faithful and loyal to physicians. 
Sarah Dock, writing in 1917, claimed that the nurse’s moral responsibilities to the 
patient were to be subordinated to the moral responsibilities to the doctor. While that 
view now arouses great indignation among nurses, it is not far fetched to see elements 
of this attitude still in nursing practice. The fatalistic acceptance of physician 
decisions, whether the nurse feels them to be in the patient’s best interests or not, is 
not uncommon. Nurses have been notoriously reluctant to accept responsibility for 
decision making, a trait much encouraged by traditional nurse training in its emphasis 
on following rules and procedures. An anecdote published recently in a major 
nursing journal illustrated the willingness of nurses to subordinate their concerns for 
patient dignity and respect to the concerns of running the system to save the doctor 
some time: it described the routine practice of making women waiting to consult a 
gynaecologist sit in a waiting room without tights and pants on.(Reid, 1992). One 
feels indignation on behalf of the women on reading this article: why don’t the clinic 
nurses? The institutions which employ nurses also seem to endorse this traditional 
assigning of nurses’ responsibilities: nurses who have challenged medical decisions to 
subject patients to electro-convulsive therapy, on the grounds that research had failed
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to prove its effectiveness and had demonstrated some harms, or on the grounds that 
that informed consent had not been obtained, have been deprived of their jobs. 
(Beardshaw 1982; Vines 1983; Vousden 1985).
The spirit of obedience to medical orders was certainly still alive and well in 1966, 
when Hofling and colleagues performed their well known experiment. (Hofling et al 
1966). Nurses were telephoned and asked by a physician who was unknown to 
them to give a patient a drug dosage which was clearly incorrect. Although several of 
the nurses queried it with the physician, on reinforcement of the medical order, 21 out 
of 22 gave the drug. I can find no trace of a replication of this experiment. One hopes 
that a contemporary experiment of this nature would have a very different outcome. 
The UKCC Code of Practice, and improved nurse education, has certainly drawn 
British nurses’ attention to their responsibilities in relation to drug administration, but 
traditional attitudes die hard.
Florence Nightingale defined a good nurse as an invisible, good woman. Oakley 
(1984) claims this to be a strength as well as a weakness of nursing. Oakley sees the 
subordination of the nurse as a strength. Since nurses are not members of a 
professional elite, which has been the object of much criticism of late, they have the 
opportunity to shape a place in health care in accordance with the needs which modem 
patients are expressing. All that the nurse has to do is to try to make people see that 
while altruism is a social strength for the community, the passivity and subservience 
expected of nurses acting as handmaidens is much less good for those who are 
altruistic: their lack of status and confidence undermines their intrinsic feeling that their 
work is valuable. She offers no guidance as to how this aim can be achieved by a 
largely powerless body of nurses in the face of current society values. I think also that 
her claim that the general public have lost faith in the technical-curative-medical model, 
and the medical profession, and are consistently challenging it, to be overstated.
In common with Oakley (1984), an American philosopher, Lisa Newton (1990) 
defends the ideal of subordination to the physician, on the grounds that patients can 
only feel rapport with nurses because they are both powerless within the system:
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nurses having no more control over the environment than do patients. If nurses were 
to acquire an equivalent status to physicians, that rapport and close understanding 
would be lost, and the patient would feel threatened. She sees submission to 
authority as an essential prerequisite for the role of ‘skilled and gentle caregiver’, on 
the grounds that the saving of life and health demands orders and procedures, which 
only the physicians have sufficient knowledge to generate. She also refers to patients 
claimed needs when she equates ‘professionalism’ with detachment, claiming that the 
public want involvement, which she clearly sees as ‘unprofessional’.
Neither of these writers are nurses, and have no experience of working in the 
subordinate relationship, although Oakley at least does recognise the negative aspects 
of this. Nurses themselves have challenged these points of view: claiming that the 
nurses’s knowledge and capabilities are being underestimated, that health care 
involves not only medical issues, and that being ‘professional’ does not necessarily 
equate with detachment. (Pence and Cantrall 1990). One could say that being 
professional does not imply a lack of emotion, but a disposition to have certain 
emotions.
Nurses as Women and Mothers
It is possible that nurses’ subordinate and powerless place in health care simply 
reflects the place of women in society. Women’s social roles tend to be organised 
around the presumption that they will serve others, and that this is the way they will be 
enhanced as individuals and accepted within their culture. (Oakley, 1984). However, 
Baker (1980) points out that there are two ways to look at the significance of the 
nurse/woman passive and subordinate role. Nurses may be passive and dependent 
because they are women, OR the nature of nursing is such that it requires the playing 
of a dependent and subservient role - and therefore women are channelled into it. The 
question here then becomes does the nature of nursing require the playing of such a 
role? I shall return to this point in the concluding chapter.
The role of the nurse, by virtue of its caring and nurturing nature, has been seen as
29
being analogous to the mother’s role in the family. Aroskar (1980), points out the 
‘uneasy resonance’ (Oakley, 1984) of the images of dr-nurse-patient, and father- 
mother-child. The doctor, like the father, makes the big decisions determining what 
the whole family will do; the mother (nurse) provides a caring environment, often 
acting as the pivot of the family, and the child (patient) follows the parents’ 
instructions, in the expectation that they are acting in her best interests. This 
‘mothering’ metaphor is an old one: ‘nursing is mothering’ - a 1905 comment, cited 
by Oakley (1984), and even today, many nurses will recognise the above pattern from 
their own practice.
Smith (1990) rejects the notion of the nurse as mother: equating the exercise of this 
role with paternalism, reinforcing dependency and passivity on the part of the patient. 
Taylor, however, examines the concept of matemalism. (Taylor, 1985). Paternalism 
is the justification of actions related to rights morality: in the name of beneficence the 
patient’s rights are overlooked. Matemalism can be seen as the justification of action 
related to the morality of care: the right thing to do is that which will avoid hurt. The 
paternalistic parent will prescribe an action ‘because this is the right thing for you to 
do’; the matemalistic parent will say ‘the choice is yours, but here is the harm you will 
be causing if you do this’ .Taylor argues that parentalism is a manifestation of caring, 
and therefore not wrong in itself, although its exercise may lead to both good and evil. 
However, this argument is unusual in contemporary health care.
The Nurse-Physician Relationship
Since the image of nurse as handmaiden has been so pervasive persisting to this day, 
(Oakley, 1984; Newton 1990), the relationship between handmaiden and superior 
should be examined.
Embodied in the contemporary physician-nurse relationship there is a survival from a 
phase in the history of medicine, when technology and cure became predominant. 
This has led to an inequal relationship in terms of power and status. When medicine is 
all powerful, care becomes the infrastructure to allow curing activity to take place, and
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the nurse becomes subordinate to the physician, tied to the technical-curative model of 
medicine. (Oakley, 1984). The ancillary medical professions may be required to act as 
if only handmaidens if curative medicine is valued. This prevents the development of 
their own skills. (Campbell and Higgs, 1982). While there may be some justification 
for this subordination, in for example, acute illness, there is none at all in the field of 
mental handicap, care of elderly, and little in terms of long term incurable sickness. 
(MacIntyre, 1983). The nurse is obligated to assist the physician in her curative duty 
because of her duty to the patient, but the physician is not similarly obligated to assist 
the nurse with her caring duty. (This is not to say that many physicians do not do so, 
simply that there is no obligation upon them to do so).It is not logically apparent why 
this should be so, unless caring and curing are not equally valued. Empirical evidence 
supports the increased responsibilities of the nurse where no cure is possible. 
(Lewandoski et al 1985; Shelley et al 1987).
There are factors other than gender stereotyping and the dominance of the technical- 
curative model which affect the relationship. Aroskar (1985) outlines what she 
considers to be obstacles to ethical nurse-physician relationships. Firstly, they have 
different views of what health care is, deriving in the former case from a care and 
environment model, and in the latter from a technical and curative model, so in many 
ways they speak different languages. Secondly, their experiences of the world they 
work in are very different: these have been described in a classic article by Sheard 
(1980). Both physician and nurse have very little understanding of the rationale 
underlying each others organisation of work, attitude to resources, and assignment of 
patients. The rewards too are clearly very different. This is an American work, and I 
think the differences are less marked in Britain, but in principle I agree with Sheard. 
This contributes to the inequality in dialogue between the two.
However, while the handmaiden image is pervasive, and can be identified in some 
current nursing practice, there is considerable evidence that this role, while outwardly 
accepted, has been manipulated by nurses. An important article by Stein, written in 
1967 and still much quoted in the literature, describes the ‘doctor-nurse game’, which 
is clearly recognisable to many nurses. The object of the game is for the nurse to
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make and have accepted a recommendation about patient care, while appearing 
passive, and making the physician seem the initiator of the recommended action. The 
most important rule is that open disagreement be avoided. The reward is the efficient 
operation of the team. The game is learnt through the respective disciplines’ education 
and socialisation processes. A nurse who breaks the rules by openly voicing 
disagreement, or suggesting action, is labelled a troublemaker, a loudmouth and 
distinctly unfeminine. The physician may break the rules by deliberately asking the 
nurse for advice: this physician is viewed with admiration and approval by nursing 
staff, and with amusement or indifference by other physicians. This game is very 
common in British hospitals also: a common ploy witnessed by myself when the 
physician appears to be in need of assistance during a resuscitation, for example, is to 
prepare the appropriate medication and to place it near the physician, either silently, or 
with the comment ‘I’ll leave this here in case you need it, Doctor’. This game is played 
tacitly, although both players know exactly what is going on, and usually achieves the 
desired outcome - patient good. The nurse knows that should she ‘overplay her hand’ 
the physician reaction may mean that this desired outcome may be lost. Nurses 
become very skilled at this game.
There is also evidence to suggest that, where it is not possible to play this game, 
nurses resort to manipulation of events in order to achieve what they see as patient 
good. Aroskar and Davis in 1978 referred to ‘the great informal power of the 
manipulative subordinate’, (p 38). Hutchinson (1990) carried out empirical work 
describing what she refers to as ‘responsible subversion’ among nurses. This is not a 
new phenomenon: Olson (1993) produces historical evidence which suggests that the 
image of traditional passivity is a myth: nurses were routinely assessed on how they 
‘managed’ the physicians with whom they worked.
If it works, why change it? Morally speaking, a three way relationship where two of 
the participants are in silent conspiracy against a third, is unhealthy and can diminish 
trust. Truth telling is a fundamental moral principle, and while it is possible to defend 
lying to someone in order to protect them, it seems very unlikely that consistent lying
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within these relationships could lead to a moral good. 5 Aroskar (1985) claims that it 
is demeaning to drs, nurses and patients when patients interests become part of a 
game. It is unethical, because it denies that physicians and nurses have significant 
contributions to make, and contravenes the Kantian principle that people should not 
use others as a means to an end decided upon by them. This applies equally to 
physicians and nurses. Here she appeals to principle. From the point of view of the 
care ethicists, the situation is less clearcut. Gilligan approves attempts to maintain 
relationships as morally justifiable; but does not discard the role of principles. It is 
tempting however to believe that she would see these attempts - to serve the patients’ 
interests and preserve relationships as morally justifiable. But the relationships 
themselves are based on deceit and manipulation. Some of Gilligan’s feminist critics 
do see Gilligan’s work as perpetuating the subservient role of women in relationships, 
and it is not far fetched I think to see this criticism being applied to this situation. 
Aroskar (1985) suggests that the key to eliminating these unhealthy games is by 
interdisciplinary education programs. However, attempts in this country several 
years ago to plan for multidisciplinary health care education were fiercely resisted by 
the medical profession, and there is no evidence to suggest this attitude is changing. 
There is some work being undertaken in the USA studying collaborative relationships; 
initial results suggest a positive effect on patient outcomes, and on nurse satisfaction. 
For example, Pike’s study showed that the incidents of moral outrage for nurses were 
diminished in units which were studying and developing collaborative relationships 
(Pike 1991). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no similar work in 
progress in the UK.
Patients’ Perspectives
Zaner, drawing on Pellegrino and Rawlinson, graphically describes the experience of 
illness and hospitalisation. (Zaner, 1985). Daily life and its concerns are disrupted; 
life is no longer under our control - illness ‘happens’ to us; debilitating and isolating 
experiences distort ordinary relationships with others. The experience erodes the 
image of ourselves we have painfully constructed over the years, and we develop
5 This point will be returned to in Chapter 5 in examining the position of the nurse.
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unusual reliance in profoundly unequal relationships with health care professionals: 
we are in a position of entrusting our wellbeing to complete strangers.
Entering hospitals for those unaquainted with them is a strange experience. The 
environment is forbidding and foreign, and the patient is required to find a vocabulary 
to describe and understand brand new experiences. Zaner, citing research evidence, 
claims that patients believe that submission and co-operation are essential in order to 
allow the doctor to reach his goals of health recovery. They are remarkably resilient 
and forgiving, tending to stay loyal to physicians, understanding that mistakes are 
made, and seeking, not revenge, but acknowledgement of and apology for these. The 
loss of bearings and strangeness described above is often compounded by lack of 
information: a common complaint of patients is ‘no-one told me what was happening’. 
Patients therefore are often constantly on the alert for news about themselves: 
watching staff behaviour, body language and so on.
Zaner uses the concept of ‘alien territory’ as a metaphor for illness. People in an alien 
territory quite naturally reconnoitre the terrain, and seek familiar and interpretable 
signs to locate themselves by. I shall return to this metaphor later in this dissertation, 
as I think it of importance when considering an appropriate concept of the role of the 
nurse. To be sick or injured is also to feel ourselves diminished in the ways which 
mark us as human - our freedom of action/choice, our ability to plan ahead, the control 
of the body by the mind and our ability to relate to other people. This too, I think, is 
an important factor in considering the role of the nurse.
It is this experience of being a patient which physicians and nurses must bear in mind 
when considering appropriate roles for themselves. The task, according to Zaner, is 
not to put themselves in the patient’s place - the patient is not like themselves - but to 
try to understand what the patient is experiencing. Evidence from patients suggest that 
staff can make the strange more easily reckoned with, by providing information 
allowing orientation and understanding. The common reasons given by professionals 
for failing to live up to these expectations are: lack of time, fear of being insulting or 
presumptuous, and the fact that patients are not really in a position to for example
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evaluate treatment alternatives - due to their lack of specialised knowledge, and the 
effects of their illness.
Those who have experienced illness and hospitalisation accord very little importance, 
apparently, to theoretical knowledge, technical skills, ethical behaviour and so on; 
placing most importance on interpersonal and communication skills, and on the human 
qualities and personality of the individual nurse. (Zaner, 1985). Studies in this 
country have shown that patients identify good nurses as those who demonstrate 
warmth, kindness, sympathy, emotional support and reassurance, and alertness to 
their needs. (Anderson, 1973; Whittet, 1994). The fundamental moral dimensions 
inherent to patient’s relationships with health professionals are the appeal to treat and 
also to care, in its broadest sense. Patients are dismayed and angered at not being 
respected and cared for, and are grateful when they are. Mothers of sick children seem 
to want and need someone who will care about them. (Zaner 1985). Ersser (1991) 
studied the responses of both nurses and patients in relation to what is important about 
nursing. Nurses identified the themes of making contact, supporting, caring, being 
available and being sensitive to need. Patients echoed these, but placed the main 
emphasis on being available, appearing to care, and understanding problems.
‘Caring’ appeared to mean much the same thing to both, and was described in non- 
technicall terms - ‘being there’, ‘giving time’. This accords with Kelly’s research, 
where nurses defined caring as ‘attending to the little things’ (Kelly 1990 and 1991a 
and b). Ersser’s research (1991) demonstrated that the most salient aspects of nursing 
for the patient are the personal qualities of the nurse
Oakley (1984) suggests that nurses have an opportunity to shape their role in health 
care according to these expressed needs. It is difficult to believe however, that 
patients would be well served by nurses who possess no theoretical knowledge, 
technical skills and reasoning power. There are clear dangers in overdoing the 
‘customer is always right’ ethos.
It appears that the general public see no contradiction between a nurse who acts in the 
way they wish her to; and a nurse who is acting as subordinate to the physician.
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Aroskar’s (1980) examination of studies in the US revealed a public perception of the 
traditional feminine image of the nurse, while the professional perception was that of a 
neutral and professional image. Media images of nurses conflict: in most popular 
drama they are clearly seen as dependent on physicians, one popular UK exception 
being ‘Casualty’. This has been acclaimed as being near realistic (allowing for 
dramatic licence). It depicts accurately the preponderance of nurses (in numbers), 
their independence of action working within a team, the range of skills required, and 
the conflicts faced in the course of working in the UK health care system. In general, 
however, although they are often portrayed as wise counsellors and caring 
individuals, they are seldom portrayed as independent decision makers. Physicians are 
the heroes, and the nurses are their supporters. Newton sees nothing wrong with the 
public image of subservience, claiming that an autonomous human being can 
deliberately choose to adopt a non- autonomous role if there are sufficiently good 
reasons for doing so, along the lines of those outlined above.
Nursing as a Profession
The traditional model of nursing, embodying the concepts of being a good woman, 
mothering, servitude, sacrifice, passivity and dependence, whatever its status with 
physicians or patients appears to be eroding, for a variety of possible reasons. 
(Muyskens, 1990). The rise of feminism has challenged sex role stereotypes (Chinn 
and Wheeler, 1985). Roles within the family have changed: the nuclear family with 
mother at home child rearing is a disappearing phenomenon. Changing technology 
has given nurses the opportunity to demonstrate the capacity for rapid diagnosis and 
treatment hitherto thought to be the preserve of physicians (in intensive and coronary 
care units; dialysis units etc). Changing age and illness distribution, with large 
numbers of patients now requiring care and sustenance as their primary needs, means 
that in these areas technical medicine is ancillary to these, rather than to medical cure. 
In the light of all of these changes, nurses now see themselves and their profession as 
certainly having the capacity for autonomy, and the rationale for acquiring such 
autonomy. Nurses have therefore striven to rid themselves of the pervasive image of 
the handmaiden to the physician. Nursing training has moved rapidly into nurse
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higher education, the professional bodies have developed codes of conduct and 
practice which view nurses as independent practitioners, and different images of the 
nurse have been proposed, the current one in vogue being that of advocate.
(discussed later in this chapter).
However, Oakley (1984) asks ‘what is so good about being professional?’ The 
medical profession are currently (she claims) suffering from a crisis in confidence - 
exemplified by the writings of Ivan Illich (1977), and graphically illustrated in a 
recent BBC television series ‘The Trouble With Medicine’, screened early in 1993.
In this view, the profession serves to keep patients dependent and damaged: it is 
wrong to wish to conspire with this oppression. In addition, there is a suspicion that 
the desire to achieve full professional status within nursing is concerned more with the 
wish to enable nurses to acquire power and status, than the desire to benefit patients. 
Oakley maintains that the professional status of an occupation has no relationship to its 
importance. I think she over simplifies here: society does on the whole accord status 
and power to those occupations which it thinks to be of vital importance.
The Nurse as Advocate
The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991) definition of the word 
‘advocate’means ‘one who pleads, intercedes or speaks for or in behalf of another: a 
pleader, interceptor or defender’. Extra dimensions of meaning exist - the word 
carries overtones of law, conflict, adversity, clear commitment to client right or 
wrong, and independence from the system. Melia clearly recognises this in summing 
these up as ‘adversarial connotations’. (Melia 1994). Whether these extra dimensions 
are widely recognised or not, this concept of the nurse is currently fashionable, and is 
the topic of considerable discussion in nursing literature in the UK. (e.g. McSweeney 
1990; Marshall 1991; Hubert 1993; Darbyshire 1993). This appears to follow in the 
train of North American interest. (Abrams, 1978; Bandman 1983; Becker 1986; 
Curtin 1986; Kohnke 1982 and 1990; Winslow 1984; Fry 1987; Curtin 1990; Pagana 
1990; Bernal 1992). The UKCC Code of Conduct is quite specific in requiring 
nurses to act in this way as part of their professional obligation to the patient. (UKCC
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1992).
The interest in advocacy can be seen as arising from the move away from nursing 
obligation to physicians, toward nursing obligation to patients, (although as we have 
seen many nurses make considerable efforts to reconcile the two). It reflects a 
changed idea of the good in wider society, from the ideals of duty and obedience to 
individual rights. The nurse advocate is expected to protect the patients interests and 
rights, and particularly the right to freedom of choice and action. However, why 
should the change of ideas have led to the notion of nurses adopting advocacy as their 
raison d’etre? Bernal (1992) suggests that this development is linked to the drive for 
nurse autonomy. Nurses recognise their own powerlessness and vulnerability, and 
transfer this conflict to patients to make it legitimate. So when a nurse overtly pleads a 
patient’s cause, she is not only promoting patient autonomy, she is exercising her 
own. Powerlessness plus powerful moral ideals lead to an uncritical assent to the 
claims of advocacy. Nurses may also see advocacy as a way out of the situation 
described earlier, that of the manipulative subordinate. There exists confusion in the 
literature between nurse and patient autonomy - sometimes it is difficult to tell which is 
being argued for. But if nurses are to clarify their role in the nurse-patient 
relationship, they need to be clear which one they are talking about.
The claim to nursing’s aspiration to serve as advocates is usually based on the fact that 
their position is unique - providing close continuous care, being skilled in 
communication and having knowledge of both the patient and the situation of the 
patient. There is a general assumption that nurses have a special moral perspective, 
deriving from this special relationship with the patient. Even if this assumption is 
correct, however, it does not logically follow that the appropriate role for the nurse to 
adopt is that of advocate. If the moral aims of nursing were to protect patient rights 
and ensure freedom of information, choice and action then logically these aims would 
be achieved from a stance of advocacy. However, there are other aims of nursing, 
discussed later, which are not addressed from an advocacy role. The moral primacy of 
rights and advocacy can lead to a diminished view of the experience of illness and the 
nurse-patient relationship. The usual reasons offered for the nurse adopting advocacy
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as a moral ideal are those of the position of the nurse offering 24 hour intimate care. 
This position it is claimed allows the nurse to acquire considerable knowledge of the 
patient, and means she is uniquely placed to defend the patient’s autonomy and so on. 
However, this conclusion does not logically follow. Relatives, or other members of 
the health care team, may have greater knowledge of the patient’s position. Many 
nurses see this quite clearly. (Johnstone 1989; Bernal 1992; Darbyshire 1993). 
Additionally, patients see themselves, not nurses, as sources of autonomy, or at least 
there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.
There are other drawbacks to the ideal of nurse as advocate. Classically, an advocate 
is fully committed to the client, impartial and uninfluenced by outside factors (Hubert
1993). Nurses are not able to achieve this complete commitment: often the patient is 
affected by the system of which the nurses are part, so they lack the independence of 
action required of an advocate. In addition, nurses have commitments to others, and 
may have to balance one patient’s interests against that of another, and of the 
community. Who decides whose rights are to take priority, and how are conflicts with 
others who see themselves as acting in the best interests of the patient to be resolved? 
There is little guidance in the literature for nurses as to how to act in these situations. 
The enthusiasm for advocacy does not often extend to pointing out the considerable 
difficulties involved, or how to deal with these.(Bandman 1983). Hubert (1987) 
describes the success of the Citizen Advocacy Scheme in Leeds, where the advocates 
are lay people, from the same ethnic groupings as the patients. These advocates are 
truly independent of the health care system, and have no professional axes to grind.
The traditional moral view encompasses a commitment to equality. This is 
indispensable to ensure that vulnerable people are not exploited. But Baier points out 
that this very commitment can conceal nuances of relationships between people who 
possess unequal power, and can also conceal the special moral demands that 
weakness, vulnerability and dependence can introduce to a relationship, such as that 
between nurse and patient. (Baier 1987). For example, if we think of relationships as 
structured in terms of rights, it is possible that the right to autonomy may subtly be 
translated into the right of non interference. This could lead to neglect and isolation, in
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a way similar to which the stance of detachment or impartiality can be transformed 
into moral blindness. From the justice perspective, relationships are viewed as 
autonomously required goods; however relationships are perhaps more accurately 
viewed as being acquired at birth, or, in nursing, coming into being by becoming ill 
and needing help.
Interdisciplinary relationships in the health care professions are often poor. To have 
one profession asserting that they alone can represent the patients’ best interests leads 
to increasing friction among them. It is difficult to argue with Bandman’s contention 
that it is virtually impossible for one discipline to function in isolation without 
interdisciplinary support. The logical conclusion, therefore, since patient care is a 
team activity, is that moral decision making (not necessarily technical) should be made 
by the team, all of whose members (including the patient, or her representatives) are 
equally qualified to do so. The reason advocacy has proven so attractive to nurses is,
I think, due to the fact that this logical consequence has been overlooked by the 
medical profession specifically, and society in general.
The adversarial connotations of advocacy are worrying, and this is recognised by 
many nurses. (Johnstone 1989, Bemal 1992, Melia 1994). Pence and Cantrell (1990) 
find it disturbing that there is a suggestion in the literature that nurses cannot carry out 
this obligation without great risk to themselves and enormous personal conflict. 
Although there is considerable dissent and debate in the literature over the concept of 
advocacy, this in itself is encouraging in that nurses appear to be moving away from 
uncritically adopting the recommendations of others, or their own leaders.
Another pragmatic factor mitigating against the development of the continuous 
relationship which is said to be the basis of autonomy is the changing of working 
practices, for example the widespread use of bank and agency staff, which may result 
in many different nurses caring for short spans of time only for any one patient.6
The simples and most convincing argument I have found against the wholescale
6 This of course has implications for conceptions other than ‘advocate’. This is discussed 
further in Chapter 7.
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adoption of ‘the nurse as advocate’ is that of Johnstone (1989). She sees the rise of 
advocacy, not simply as a response to societal changes in ideas of the good, and 
power imbalances within the professions, but as a reflection of the way in which 
nurses are now trying to explain the moral basis of the nurse patient relationship.
This, however, will only be possible if nurses and philosophers can clearly articulate 
advocacy as ‘a moral concept containing a morally compelling force’, and demonstrate 
its existence as the foundation of the relationship. This has not yet been achieved: no 
nurse has been able to satisfactorily answer the question “Why should I, the nurse, be 
the patient’s advocate?”
The advocacy model, I suggest, is unable to serve as a complete one for nurses.
While there is no doubt in my mind that a nurse has a duty to intervene if she sees 
action on the part of others (whoever they are) leading to patient harm, deriving from 
the general duties owed toward the patient, this aspect of nursing does not fully 
characterise the relationship between patient and nurse. This temporary relationship 
involves a suffering, vulnerable and unique individual, and a member of a health care 
team, with a characteristic professional disposition. This relationship is played out 
within the context of a bureaucratic system.
The limitations of advocacy appear to be recognised by nursing leaders, who seek to 
broaden the perspective from the specific protection of rights to a more general idea of 
acting in the patient’s best interests. The UKCC Code of Practice carries the rider that 
no adversarial connotation is intended by the use of the word advocacy. However, a 
major criticism of this stance is that it leaves the notion of ‘acting in best interests’ up 
to the interpretation of the individual nurse, offering no guide for action.
There is little evidence that nurses do act as advocates in an effective manner. The 
nurses in Hutchinson’s study (1990) saw themselves as acting as advocates: 
however, the tactics they used were those of concealment and subversion, not those of 
open disclosure and willingness to put the patient’s case to others; tactics 
conventionally associated with advocacy. No empirical study reveals nurses acting in 
accord with a classic model of advocacy. (That is not to say however that they do not;
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simply there is no evidence). There is however considerable evidence to suggest that 
when nurses do act as advocates, in the accepted sense of the word, they are either 
ignored or punished. (Beardshaw 1982; Vines 1983; Vousden 1985; Johnstone 1989; 
Turner 1990; Wright 1990; Tadd 1991; Jones 1993).
Existential Advocacy
Sally Gadow, an American nurse philosopher, has attempted to explicate advocacy as 
the philosophical foundation of nursing. (Gadow 1983 and 1990). She is very clear 
that she is not using advocacy in the sense of consumer rights. Her thinking can be 
difficult to follow, but I take her idea of nursing advocacy to be that the nurse helps 
people to become clear about what they want. This is done not just by providing 
information, but by helping patients to see the meaning of their experience of illness 
and hospitalisation and to be sure of how they wish to deal with this. Her ideas are 
attractive because she gives patients the credit for being able to be their own advocates 
(in the rights meaning of the word). She sees the nurse as having, not necessarily the 
deepest knowledge of the patient’s situation, but the broadest: knowledge of that 
particular patient’s experience of illness and treatment; scientific knowledge of the 
body, illness and treatment; knowledge of the patient’s body responses to treatment 
and care. Although other people have greater knowledge of single aspects - doctors of 
the disease, relatives of the patient’s personality - the nurse has a unique perspective 
deriving from a synthesis of these. She sees professional care as the involved 
synthesis of emotion, intellect and practical skill. The unique contribution of the nurse 
is to assist in ‘unifying the lived and object body’. I take this to mean that she helps 
the patient understand what is happening to their bodies, thus enabling them to ‘make 
sense’ of their experiences and retain a feeling of control, but in this I may be over 
simplifying her ideas.
Gadow seems to have a clearly worked out philosophy of nursing: I am not at all sure 
that it can be considered to be advocacy. I think she has moved so far away from the 
original concept that another term might be more appropriate. Gadow I think takes 
account of what may be unique about the role of the nurse which has to be addressed
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in developing an account of the moral base of nursing: the importance of the body, and 
the ‘in-between’ situation of the nurse (discussed later). Gadow’s ideas are not 
inconsistent with those of Alistair Campbell, a Scottish theologian who has written a 
theology of professional care, within which he singles out nursing for consideration. 
The conception of the nurse which he offers, though, is that of ‘the skilled 
companion’. (Campbell 1984b).
The Skilled Companion
What has been termed ‘the ethical enterprise of nursing’ (Allmark 1992) requires a 
theory of ethics based on the reality of what happens in everyday nursing practice. 
Most attention has been paid to the problems and conflicts faced by nurses; little 
attention has been paid to what Benner (1991) refers to as ‘ethical comportment’ - the 
way in which everyday transactions between nurse and patients take place.
Campbell (1984 b) deals with ideas which have not been popularly considered as 
related to the moral concerns of nursing. These include the ideas of embodiment, of 
intimacy, and of the emotions, culminating in his image of the nurse’s unique role as a 
‘skilled companion’, offering, in common with other caring professionals, ‘moderated 
love’. These ideas of the nature of nursing accord well with the practical experience of 
nursing, as revealed by both anecdotal and empirical research evidence.
Embodiment
Medicine and nursing are essentially physical activities; Campbell, drawing from 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, states that they deal with the embodiment of distress. 
During illness, the body assumes a prominence which it normally does not have in 
everyday life - it becomes a hindrance to action, and not an instrument of action.
When people need help with body functioning, they become patients.
In addition, good, according to Campbell, always has a bodily manifestation. In a
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similar way to that in which Gilligan uses the metaphor of voice (the voice of care, the 
voice of justice) to describe moral perspectives (Gilligan 1982), Campbell uses the 
voice of the body to describe moral actions. The body of the nurse offers care, the 
body of the patient receives care. Knowledge and skill are required on the part of the 
nurse to ‘tune in’ to the patient’s bodily needs and to adequately meet these. Care is 
sensuous in the true sense of the word: physical care can be carried out in a sensuous 
way with respect for the person. The body as a moral instrument has been 
significantly neglected in literature, yet it is through the body that we communicate 
spontaneity, care, embarrassment, distress and so on. Campbell refers to the 
‘caressing of companionship’ (p 110) as a very basic human experience, first 
encountered in the relationship with the mother. He describes the intimacy of 
professional privileged access to the body as dangerous, and claims that a) it needs 
channeling by a professional ideal, and b) the professional carer must be committed to 
a degree of sensitivity and discretion. ‘ Unauthorised touching of another’s body is an 
indignity which is to be forbidden’ (Prossser, cited in Engelhardt 1985 p 77).
Both medical and nursing carers are bound by these requirements. The difference 
between the two professions, however, lies in both the temporal and intentional 
nature of the contact, (in this context). Medical contact tends to be fleeting and 
infrequent: nursing contact is on an hour to hour basis. Any one nurse will tend to 
have repeated contact, particularly physical, over a period of 8 -1 2  hours over several 
days. Doctors have physical contact with patients with two clear aims in mind - 
diagnosis and therapy. Nurses on the other hand have less clear cut intentions. 
Physical contact can be seen as instrumental - administering medications, attending to 
personal hygiene, monitoring blood pressure etc. Affective contact occurs when touch 
is used for reassurance and comfort - hand holding, touching the face or head and so 
on. An empirical study by Lutzen and Nordin (1993) suggested that nurses integrate 
caring ‘for’, i.e. medications, bathing etc. with caring ‘about’, i.e. comforting, 
reassuring and seem not to see these as separate. It is this ‘caring about’, as expressed 
through caring fo r the body, which sets the nurse aside from other caring 
professionals. Moral dilemmas arise for nurses when these functions are separated, as 
when the caring ‘for’ involves physician ordered treatment which either nurse or
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patient are unhappy with. It becomes difficult then to express caring ‘about’ through 
caring ‘for’. (Lutzen and Nordin 1993). As has been previously discussed, these are 
the areas in which the greatest dilemmas arise for nurses. Campbell claims that 
medicine tends to shy away from the body. (Campbell 1984b).
The nursing orientation to the body is revealed in everyday nursing language about 
‘hands on’ care, ‘bedside’ nursing, admiration for a leader who ‘gets their hands 
dirty’, and so on. The notorious reluctance of nurses to give up the ‘back round’ has 
been attributed to a resistance to change, and an ignorance of the significance of the 
research findings. While not discounting these it is at least possible that part of the 
reluctance may have been to relinquish the symbolism of the ritual.
Considering that much of nursing work revolves around the body, little empirical 
work has been done in nursing into how nurses deal with the body, with the exception 
of Australian research carried out by Lawler (1991). She explored the skills nurses 
develop to reduce fear and harm to patients requiring intimate physical interventions, 
in areas of nursing which are little discussed and are therefore ‘invisible’ to outsiders. 
Experienced nurses are well aware of how patients watch them closely for their 
reaction when, for example, unpleasant wounds are dressed, and they deliberately 
adopt an attitude intended to send the message that the wound makes no difference to 
their perception of the patient. She has tried to make this implicit knowledge explicit. 
A major aim appears to be the preservation of what the nurse sees as appropriate social 
relationships, and the protection of patients’ vulnerability and self image. Nurses 
appear to use both verbal and body language to achieve these aims. These aims appear 
to me to be moral aims, in that their goal is to demonstrate respect for and thus achieve 
the good for an individual. Despite this, although Lawler did not explore this point, 
the nurses in the study did not seem to explicitly identify these as moral concerns.7
7 (This echoes a common feature in nursing ethics research: nurses in Schrock’s study identified 
issues such as abortion and euthanasia as moral in nature, but not issues like truth telling (Schrock 
1980). Kelly’s respondents (1 9 9 0 ,1991a and b) did not see their actions in taking care to attend to 
the ‘little things’ which mean so much to people as overtly ethical actions, although they were well 
aware they did not come under the umbrella of their technical responsibilities. Any explicated 
philosophy of nursing would have to account for these concerns: I believe that these are 
understandable if the nurse is seen as a companion/guide - concerned to protect the patient’s sense of 
self on a journey through a strange place - see later discussion.)
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Lawler’s thesis is that nurses practise using what she calls ‘somology’ - ‘a view of 
corporeal existence which integrates the lived body experience with the object body 
and which meets each of the essential elements for an adequate theory of the body in 
social life’. (Lawler 1990, thesis abstract). Nurses therefore learn strategies for 
managing the body in order to protect and respect the patient.
Gadow (1987) sees the preservation and enhancement of dignity as the key moral 
concern of the nurse. She is careful to point out that she is using the word in the 
broadest sense, i.e. not just preserving privacy (although I disagree with her use of the 
word trivial to describe this work), but encouraging and maintaining a sense of 
personal integrity and self esteem. I see this key concern being expressed by nurses 
participating in Lawler’s study, although Gadow has little to say about the care of the 
body. Gadow’s idea of caring involves attention to the ‘objectness’ of the body 
without reducing the person to the moral status of an object: a view which is consistent 
with the Kantian tradition of treating people as ends in themselves. Empirically, this 
notion has been found to be demonstrated by nurses in the course of their work.
(Kelly 1990 and 1991a and b, Lawler 1991).
Physical care is important in symbolic ways; an importance founded on the 
phenomenon of touch. (Gadow 1987). Gadow sees touch as a way in which to 
counteract the tendency to turn patients into objects. The nurse’s touch can reduce the 
patient’s isolation, and can allow participation in his/her experience, thus increasing 
the capacity of the nurse to fulfil the role of companion/guide discussed elsewhere.
In this society, intimate touch is associated with sexuality - Lawler has shown how 
nurses can use touch in a way which suggests friendship and sensuousness, rather 
than sexuality. The significance of this physical contact is increasingly being realised 
in nursing, with nurses studying the therapeutic use of touch (Bottorff 1991, 
McMahon and Pearson 1991) in order to realise the moral aims of nursing.
In this culture it is impossible to handle the body of a stranger without having to 
acquire particular attitudes. Nurses who learn the technique of performing the last 
offices are being taught an emotional attitude as much as a technical skill. (Campbell
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and Higgs 1982). This attitude appears to be one of respect for the body: the student 
nurse is taught that the nurse has a duty to provide care after the moment of death in 
the same way as care was provided in life. The deceased is treated by careful 
handling, provided with fresh linen (even in the face of shortages) and close attention 
is paid to the environment in which her relatives will see her.
The evidence then suggests that Campbell is correct in his emphasis on the importance 
of the body in the nurse-patient relationship.
Emotions
Campbell describes the powerful emotional associations attached to the image of 
nursing, equating these with mothering (or parenting). The body is cared for, growth 
is respected, independence is promoted, potential and needs are perceived, and goals 
decided on. Drawing on Tillich, and in accord with Callahan, he sees the emotional 
element in professional care as of central importance. This is in direct opposition to 
the prevailing ethos in health care; of offering patients a service which can be costed, 
based on scientific evidence of the effectiveness of various types of procedures, 
techniques etc. However, the emotional reactions of carers to suffering and distress 
lead to the reactions of sympathy, empathy and fellow feeling. This, according to 
Scheler, upon whom Campbell is drawing at this point, prepares the way for the 
action of love.This emotional reaction may be blind to rules, outcomes and principles, 
but may in fact lead to moral good.
Drawing again on Scheler, he maintains that one must be able to let go of the self in 
order to allow participating in and identification with the other’s experience, and that 
the loss of this capacity allows the development of an instrumental and dominational 
view of the professional-patient relationship. This capacity, to emotionally engage 
with another individual, it is claimed, offers a mediating position between the body 
and the mind. (Perhaps dealing with the physical body predisposes to this capacity.)
The conventional professional response to the place of emotion is that emotion should
47
be discounted: detached and analytical responses to situations are in the patients best 
interests. But emotions can lead to moral good as well as bad. Blum (1980) 
maintains that the moral emotions are as valid and reliable as the rational constructs. 
Treating moral decisions as a set of computed moves is to dehumanise them and 
render them immoral. This is not to say however, that emotion should be the sole 
determinant of action. Emotion has to be tempered with reason, and vice versa. The 
drive for action comes from the emotion; the decision as to what the action should be 
comes from reason. To achieve the good, the balance has to be right. This is at odds 
with current thinking in nursing texts, with one or two notable exceptions, where the 
requirement for detached reasoning is clearly reflected in nursing texts and codes as 
previously described. These in the main do not take account of the emotional side of 
nursing. In fact, detachment and lack of emotion is seen as a moral good. However, 
there is a trend recently, especially in American nursing, toward viewing emotional 
detachment as a moral fault (discussed in literature review Chapter 2.) Gilligan and 
Poliak (1988), working with doctors, found that they were more concerned to protect 
their objectivity, and less concerned to protect their involvement with the patient. The 
indications from the literature are that nurses would be concerned to protect patient 
involvement rather than objectivity. However, there is evidence that health care 
professionals may use detachment and indifference to protect themselves from the 
discomfort caused by allowing emotional involvement with their patients, rather than 
to protect their reasoning abilities (Benoliel 1967). Where evidence suggests that 
nurses become detached, this is done in order to protect themselves emotionally, not 
preserve their objectivity.
The role of the emotions has long been discredited in professional life: the aim, 
strongly in keeping with Kantian ethics, is to maintain objectivity and detachment in 
order to prevent the emotions from clouding perception of the issues at stake. This 
former attitude is very familiar to practising nurses: I have on occasion witnessed 
medical decisions being taken on the grounds of ‘we’d better do something about this 
chap’s pain, the nurses are getting emotional’. This said with a tolerant and 
understanding smile. But perhaps it is equally true to say that only by allowing 
oneself to experience emotion can the issues at stake be truly perceived. Johnstone
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(1989 p 228-235) reports on research in the early 1970’s by Char and McDermott into 
nurses working with women undergoing abortion. Although the nurses had no 
religious objections to abortion, and understood the needs of the mothers, they 
experienced considerable distress at having to deal with delivery and disposal of the 
foetuses. This aroused considerable conflict within them about the ‘rightness’ of what 
was being done. This moral distress was interpreted by the researchers as a psychiatric 
problem stemming from the nurses’ own sexual difficulties, an astounding conclusion 
from the presented evidence. In 1981, Davis felt free to report research results, 
demonstrating the inability of nurses to articulate their ethical stance, with the rider that 
these young female employees’ sentimental or emotional reaction to situations tended 
to discredit them and allow others not to take them seriously. It is for this widely 
perceived reason that so much research emphasis especially in America has been 
directed toward finding ways of educating nurses to think critically and objectively 
about ethical problems. There is no doubt that nurses require to be able to do this, but 
there is a danger that this ability, and the capacity to experience emotion, are seen as 
mutually exclusive. In pressing nurses to rid themselves of emotional responses, the 
danger is that moral perception or sensitivity may be reduced. Ideally, the nurse 
should be able to harness powers of critical reasoning to emotional responses to 
situations and people.
Campbell raises the notion of ‘critical distance’. The professional is distanced enough 
to exercise objective judgment and to offer support, but not so distanced that response 
to the sufferer is prevented. This difficult balancing act may be enhanced if the nurse 
remains clear about what the aims of the relationship are. This will be discussed in the 
closing chapter.
The Expression of Emotion in Nursing
It is customary in today’s health care system to view patients as customers, or clients, 
and the nurse as one who provides a service to them. However, as has already been 
discussed, patients are vulnerable, sick and in distress. As Bowlby and Weiss have 
shown (cited in Ersser, 1991) an increase in attachment behaviour is seen as normal in
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these conditions. Nurses appear to recognise and reciprocate this, while also 
recognising the usually short duration of the attachment. Considerable anecodotal and 
research evidence exists in relation to the emotions experienced in nursing. Smith 
(1992) describes the ‘emotional labour’ of nursing. Her work suggests that both 
positive and negative aspects of emotional labour experienced by nurses have a 
profound effect on patients.8 Goodwin et al (1979) studying the use of placebos by 
both physicians and nurses suggested that the issue is not simply one of honesty, but 
that emotional issues such as anger toward patients are involved. Brown and 
Thompson (1979) revealed the actions of nurses in delaying or preventing 
resuscitation by physicians, based on emotional responses to the situation. Ersser 
(1991) also explores the concept of emotional labour. This study suggests that nurses 
deliberately use their own emotions to influence patient welfare. He describes this 
deliberate use in terms of ‘trust’ work, ‘composure’ work, and so on.
Those who work with people are human, and so will experience feelings of disgust, 
anger or resentment toward some of them some of the time. (Gow 1982). This is 
accepted by social workers, psychiatrists and psychologists. Time and effort is 
required to learn how to cope with these: which is why these practitioners study to 
degree level, and begin their work in sheltered areas where they are given few clients 
and intense supervision. Nurses do not have this degree of preparation; plus they also 
have full 8 hours continuous contact - not one appointment. In addition, they are 
required to carry out physical care which is often hard and unpleasant, they are 
required to be armed with considerable knowledge, and they are required to be able to 
cope with emotionally charged and demanding situations. It can be argued with 
validity that all of this places far more strain on their capabilities in interpersonal 
relationships than any other profession. As previously discussed, most patients 
require nurses to care. Caring involves emotion and it has to be sincere, most people 
are able to tell if someone really cares or is just acting. In addition, as the relationship 
between nurse and patient/relatives develops, it is unlikely that the nurse could 
continuously ‘act’ emotions, without people realising that they were not sincere.
8 (The subjects of this study were student nurses: Lawler’s work (1991) on experienced nurses 
suggests that experienced nurses may be more able to limit these effects on patients).
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(Darbyshire 1990).
The nurse therefore has to try to be better than her natural self: i.e. the professional 
role requires her in certain situations to be more than just herself (Gow 1982). If the 
moral ideal of moderated love which Campbell describes (see chapter 4) is a true 
description of a professional relationship, then emotional involvement of some degree 
is inevitable. The question then becomes, are nurses clear as to what moral aim the 
emotion is directed toward.
Nursing needs to be very realistic about this, and to be very clear on both the demands 
on, and the possibilities for, the emotions of the nurse. As previously discussed, 
nurses can develop character armour to deal with these huge demands, and may leam 
detachment as a protection. However, there are signs that some nurses at least are 
well aware of the therapeutic effects of their emotional labour. Gow’s respondents 
(1982) appeared to believe that what made the difference between helping and not 
helping a patient was the way the nurse’s inevitable emotional response was expressed 
and directed.
In comparing the emotional work of nurses with air hostesses, Hochschild (cited in 
Darbyshire 1990) argues that most emotional labour is invisible. This may be the case 
in nursing, but many patients and relatives do demonstrate awareness of nurses 
emotional work, and feel that it is important to them. (Darbyshire 1990, Gillan 1994).
The data suggest that though nurses deliberately use their own emotions it is not 
always in the form of bedside ‘armour’. Ersser (1991) draws on Strauss in explaining 
the use of emotions as ‘sentimental work’. This could be for example ‘composure 
work’, aimed at helping during fear or pain; or ‘trust work’, aimed at displaying 
concern and competence. There is considerable evidence, therefore, that for nurses 
and patients, the emotional component of their work is important to them . This is in 
accord with Campbell’s ideas of the central importance of the emotions in a 
professional ethic. The evidence, however, also suggests that the institutions and the 
physicians with whom nurses work either ignore or ridicule its importance.
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Companionship
The companionship which Campbell describes is a ‘bodily presence which 
accompanies the other for a while’.(p 49). He recommends the image of a journey 
undertaken by two chance met companions, who then separate. What happens during 
the period of companionship may affect the length of the journey, and how it is 
remembered. The relationship may also encourage a striving to reach the end, or may 
discourage to the point of giving up. He describes three ways in which nursing can be 
said to be this kind of companionship. Firstly, there is the presence of the body 
(already discussed). He speaks of the sensitivity of one companion to the other’s 
needs, idiosyncrasies etc. Secondly, the journey has a goal; the companion alleviates 
the hardness of the journey by looking toward to the goal. Nursing skills and 
knowledge help them to see that goal. Thirdly, the companionship involves being 
with, not just doing to; entailing the sharing of risk, and the difficulties such a demand 
makes on the companion. And lastly, the commitment is limited, parting is essential. 
(Campbell 1984b). In Campbell’s companionship, there is personal involvement and 
a giving to the other which transcends skill or technique.9 Illness disrupts peoples 
lives, and impairs their capacity to deal with the journey. They therefore become 
unusually reliant on the companion.
Campbell also offers the idea that the knowledge of the good in the relationship stems 
from the meeting of the world of sickness and the world of the patient. This is 
reminiscent of both Zaner’s (1985) and MacIntyre’s (1983) idea of the meeting of two 
worlds. It seems to me therefore that the image of the nurse here is not simply that of 
companion, but that of guide and interpreter, taking some responsibility for the 
journey being made. Note that it is some responsibility, not total responsibility. It is 
the traveller who knows where he wishes to go, and the companion/guide who tries to 
ensure this happens, but the relationship is unequal in the sense that one partner is 
more than usually reliant on the other.
9 Here he implies that the two parties are equal, but later says the two do not stand in the same 
position. But surely companions do stand in the same position?
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MacIntyre suggests that the current relationship of nurse-physician purports to be but 
is not functional. Concentrating on the conceptual division between care and cure may 
hide this. Currently there is a function waiting to be performed which he claims is not: 
that of interpreting the patient to the physician and vice versa. The most obvious 
person to take this role is the nurse, and I would suggest from my own experience that 
many nurses do undertake this: for example, ‘sister’s rounds’ taking place after 
medical rounds with just this purpose in mind. MacIntyre sees the nurse as emissary 
or interpreter between two cultures. However, this description seems to imply 
passivity on the part of the nurse: the evidence suggests that there is more active 
manipulation of the interface of the two cultures by the nurse. (Davis and Aroskar 
1978; Hutchinson 1990). A persistent theme which arises from talking to patients is 
that they want to know what is happening. (Zaner 1985). The intricacies of diagnosis 
and therapy can be complex and difficult for the physician to understand; for the 
patient who is compromised by the experience of being ill it can be impossible. To be 
a patient is to be constantly on the alert. They grasp at encouraging things, and 
magnify bad things. They want their carers to tell them what they know, and to do so 
in a way which demonstrates their perception of them as a person.
The forbidding and foreign environment of both illness and hospital is a culture shock 
which requires patience to endure. (Zaner 1985). People have difficulty in articulating 
new and strange experiences, often describing themselves as having lost their 
bearings. The nurse acting as companion may make the strange more comfortable, 
better able to be reckoned with and contribute to the restoration of confidence.
Perhaps the nurses described by Kelly (1990 and 1991a and b) as placing importance 
on ‘taking care of the little things’ e.g. making room amongst technical equipment for 
personal photographs and belongings, maintaining the patient’s normal routine of 
bathing instead of forcing her to adopt an institutional routine, ensuring favoured food 
is ordered, and so on, are attempting to reduce the strangeness for their patients. 
Suffering of any kind is a threat to the sense of self. If the patient is allowed to remain 
suffering, when this can be avoided, then they have been abandoned. It is the task of 
the companion to ensure abandonment does not occur.
53
Zaner’s image of the ‘alien territory’ of illness and suffering lends itself very well to 
the idea of a companion/guide, familiar with the terrain and equipped with the skills to 
lead the patient through it. Campbell’s metaphor of the nurse as skilled companion, 
extended to include the ideas of interpreting and guiding, seems to be one which 
meets this need. The nurse’s ‘in-between-position’ (discussed in Chapter 5) makes 
her the obvious candidate to fill this role. Because of the physical intimacy and 
continued contact of nursing described above, nurses have the potential to be very 
aware of the patient’s body and feelings, and at least to a limited extent of the patient’s 
own particular world. Their knowledge base and experience also gives them 
awareness of the world of sickness and therapy. The moral aspiration here, I believe, 
therefore is to synthesise these awarenesses in order to inform, interpret (in both 
directions) and guide their patient through the world of distress and suffering. This 
aspiration may be more easily achieved if the nurse is working from a position of 
involved reasoning and disciplined emotion as described above. Illness seems 
uniquely capable of awakening a special moral sense that is usually dormant but that 
on special occasions can be brought to the surface. (Zaner 1985).
Gow’s research identified three main helping responses of the nurse: providing moral 
support, acting as a sounding board, and providing explanations. This empirical 
finding fits well with the image of the nurse as guide/interpreter/companion. (Gow 
1982).
In thinking about what makes the role of the nurse unique, the traditional view is to 
consider care versus cure; the nurse cares, the physician cures. With the changing 
focus of health care, this boundary is becoming blurred. But what is certainly true to 
say is that where no physician assistance is possible, there is a very important role for 
the nurse as companion. Care of the dying, care of the elderly, care of the mentally 
handicapped are all areas where the major focus of health care is a nursing one. No 
other member of the team is in a position to fulfil this role. The role is taken seriously 
by nurses, but seldom articulated. It is customary practice, even in acute care settings, 
however, to allocate a nurse to stay with a patient when death is anticipated, and no 
relatives are present. Many nurses make considerable efforts in the face of staffing and
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work pressures to provide this companionship, regardless of whether the patient is or 
is not apparently aware of it. This idea of companionship extends often to the 
relatives. Even when relatives are present, considerable efforts are made to maintain 
continued and frequent contact with them, even at times when no physical care has to 
be provided for the patient. Care and companionship are often transferred to the 
relatives, a fact which has considerable impact on them (Gillan 1994).
Campbell, is therefore, not alone in seeing the role of the nurse as that of companion. 
The evidence suggests that both nurses and patients regard companionship as at least 
part of their role. Influenced by MacIntyre (1983) and Zaner (1985), I suggest that this 
conception could be usefully extended to include that of guide and interpreter.
Engelhardt (1985) maintains that the only differences between nurse and doctor are in 
social roles and power, and claims that there is no conceptual core unique to nurses. 
Nurses only fill niches where there is no competition from physicians. Even if this is 
so, and being a companion is a role brought into being by the structure of society, this 
does not preclude it having a moral foundation. The relationships brought into being 
by the adoption of the roles are different in nature, and as Campbell and Higgs point 
out, it is necessary to evaluate the nature of the relationship in any moral assessment 
(Campbell and Higgs 1982).
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CHAPTER 4: THE NURSE - PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
In order to fully characterise the concept of the nurse, it is necessary not simply to 
examine the role which the nurse might fulfil, but also the relationship within which 
the role is played out.
It is generally agreed in the literature that in any health care relationship a moral 
obligation arises from the special relationship between the carer and the one seeking 
care. (Pellegrino andTomasma 1981, Campbell 1984, Fry 1989, Tschudin1992).
The presence of an afflicted person seems uniquely capable of awakening ‘ a moral 
sense that is usually dormant, but that on special occasions can be brought to the 
surface’. (Schweitzer, cited in Zaner 1985 p 102). Nurses and doctors therefore have 
the opportunity to regard every meeting with affliction as a ‘special occasion’, 
bringing forth this moral sense. This view has not gone without challenge 
(Downiel986 a, b). It could be said that these moral responsibilities are neither more 
nor less than those which any service profession holds. How we wish to be treated 
by for example a car mechanic is analogous to how we wish to be treated by a doctor 
or nurse: with respect and courtesy, efficiency and a concern for doing the job well. 
Up to a point this is certainly true. This relationship differs however in two important 
ways: firstly, we are not required to allow the car mechanic access to our bodies or 
intimate concern to allow him to carry out the service he is performing; and secondly, 
if we do not approve of the estimate, or the way in which the mechanic deals with us, 
we are in a position to leave and seek another; in other words we are able to maintain 
control. We may be dismayed and upset by his actions, but a) they are much less 
threatening to our sense of self than they would be in a doctor or nurse and b) we have 
much more control over them.
We are all vulnerable to how others treat us; but much more vulnerable to some than 
others. The increased vulnerability of sickness and distress, I would suggest, places a 
correspondingly greater responsibility on anyone charged with the job of alleviating 
suffering. (I include in this category anyone who deals with the distressed, not just
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doctors and nurses; simply they are two of the occupations who do this on a regular 
basis).
Why is it important to consider the nature of this relationship? A theme in Campbell’s 
work which is of particular interest is his emphasis on assessing actions by evaluating 
the nature of the relationships between the agent of care and the recipient of care, 
rather than on the results of the encounter or by the rules of a particular code, or set of 
principles, (although he does not deny the usefulness of these). It is in the evaluation 
of relationships that ‘we most urgently need criteria for moral judgement’. (Campbell 
and Higgs 1982 p 10). This is surely correct; well established methods exist to 
evaluate outcomes of action (Dowie, 1994); codes of practice have been developed to 
assist us to follow principles for action. We also have access to the considerable 
discussion which has taken place over how those principles should be addressed in 
professional life (Gillon 1985; Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Review of the 
literature suggests that the focus of contemporary morality is seen as the right of the 
individual to choose his actions. However, as Campbell and Higgs point out, the 
ability of the individual within a helping relationship to choose is affected by the nature 
of the relationship (Campbell and Higgs 1982).
There are a variety of models, both descriptive and prescriptive, proposed to describe 
the nurse-patient relationship. Within these relationships, the nurse can occupy a role 
such as advocate, companion, surrogate mother and so on. 10 The following are the 
main ones considered in the literature.
Contractual Relationship
The characteristics of a contractual relationship are described by Thompson, Melia and 
Boyd (1994). Like a commercial contract, the relationship is governed by the demands 
of justice, rights and duties. The patient voluntarily seeks help, and access to the 
nurse’s knowledge and caring skills. There is a formal or informal contract to care.
10 Although it seems intuitively correct to say that these two must be interdependent, it is 
possible to imagine a nurse acting as, for example, an advocate both within a contractual and 
a covenantal relationship.
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The patient accepts the need to co-operate, and the nurse accepts the duty to care, 
repaying the patient’s trust by providing competent service.
This analogy appears limited in its power to capture the nature of the relationship in 
that the two partners are in an unequal position, and that usually neither is in a position 
to terminate the contract, unlike commercial contracts. This view of the nurse-patient 
relationship is one which regards patients as consumers and health as a commodity. It 
assumes that the patient is capable of determining his own best interests. There is a 
belief that the ethical responsibility of the nurse is determined by rights. (Smith 1980). 
According to Brock, an American writer, the nurse can opt out of the relationship, 
citing the special case of abortion. (Brock 1980). However it is difficult to see how 
nurses can reconcile this stance with the duty owed to their employer, and to their 
patients, apart from this special circumstance. According to Brock, the key to this 
model is the patient’s freedom to determine her relationship with the nurse. Brock’s 
nurse-patient relationship is essentially the same as that of the physician patient 
relationship. But Smith points out the nurse has an extra obligation to the physician 
because of patient agreement, thus altering the quality of the nurse-patient 
relationship.
Brock’s account of the clinical contract claims that the rights and duties in the 
relationship become explicable only in terms of a contractual model. While nurses 
often act as advocates, surrogate mothers, physician assistants and so on, the duties 
involved in these roles can all be explained with reference to this model. He answers 
the objections outlined above by saying that the nurse is an indirect party to an implicit 
agreement between patient and health care system. She becomes committed to the 
relationship by virtue of the contract with the hospital.
He does not say anything about the extent to which nurses are aware of this indirect 
and explicit commitment, or whether this distanced view of the nurse-patient 
commitment is desirable.
May (1975) criticises contracts on the grounds that they promote self interest, and
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confine the response to needs to those which are outlined in the contract.
Covenantal Relationship
The most detailed account of caring relationships as covenantal relationships is given 
by May (1975). According to him, truth telling is the basis for the relationship in the 
sense that the doctor needs to be true to promises (he is considering primarily 
physician-patient relationships). The covenant is primarily based on a promise, and 
fidelity to that promise. It is characterised by an anticipated exchange of gifts, labours 
or services, and this covenant is responsive in nature - not one sided. Thompson, 
Melia and Boyd (1994) define a covenant as a commitment of mutual fidelity, 
grounded in respect for persons. The patient offers trust freely, and the carer accepts 
the duties freely. The covenant is based on the Judeo Christian ethical tradition. It has 
three elements: a gift (the presence of the patient), a promise based on the gift, (to 
provide care) leading to an experience of altered being, which engenders a set of 
obligations (the duties owed by the carer). The covenant is initiated by the patient.
Cooper (1988) argues forcefully for a covenantal view of the relationship as a basis 
for a nursing ethic, drawing on Gadow, Veatch and May. She endorses May’s claim 
that the covenant arises from the moral principle of fidelity. However, as this 
principle is implicit in other relationships e.g. physician-patient, it is difficult to see 
why she advocates it as the basis of a specific nursing ethic.
Campbell (1984b) proposes that his ‘skilled companion’ offers ‘moderated love’ 
within a covenantal relationship. He endorses May’s claims and draws on Ramsay to 
emphasise the importance of fidelity in the professional helping relationship. The 
covenant he envisages promises a much more active concern on behalf of the patient 
than the restrictive contract. Unlike other writers, he explicitly acknowledges the 
importance of physical action in the relationship: “The covenantal relationship which 
promotes trust and mutuality requires bodily mediation in order for its true value to be 
appropriated by helper and helped alike” ( p i l l ) .
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‘Moderated Love’
Campbell draws on the work of the sociologist Halmos, who claims that some forms 
of professional care can be seen as the offering of love. The orientation is nearer to 
religious faith than scientific detachment. Campbell, drawing on his knowledge of the 
caring professions, including nursing, develops this idea, offering parallels between 
Christian values and professional values (Campbell, 1984), although he says that a 
Christian belief is not essential to professionals.
Campbell’s main thesis is that ‘moderated love’ is the moral ideal for professional 
practice to aspire to. The relationship between love and benevolence he takes to be 
crucial for any moral theory. Hume also takes it to be central; Kant to be irrelevant. 
Nursing ethics texts in general appear to follow a Kantian line, although there are 
signs that this is changing. Kant, although he has nothing to say in relation to the 
emotions, does equate his ‘respect for persons’ with the Christian idea of ‘agape’, the 
injunction to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’. Love is defined as a spontaneous 
emotional response, transformed into a therapeutic technique. There is a commitment 
to the welfare of others, transcending personal advantage and professional 
advancement.11 It is this love which Campbell says is moderated and offered by 
professional carers. Moderating love is a skill - balancing involvement and 
detachment, and also a symbolic role - representing society’s concern and hope for the 
ill and distressed individual. Moderation of love is understood in three different ways: 
firstly, the ethic of agape is drawn upon, and the emotional response is tied to the 
command to respect all humans equally. Secondly, moderation tempers the 
relationship - there are not extremes and sudden changes which characterise personal 
love. And thirdly, the moderation of love symbolises an attempt to reach an 
impossible ideal - it is therefore the embodiment of hope. Campbell identifies 
features for each caring profession which form the basis for love - brotherhood in 
medicine, and companionship in nursing. Three features are singled out as essential to
11 Campbell does not deny that many professionals do act in their own self interest: he 
appears to be saying only that there is the potential to achieve this good, and that 
professionals should aspire to this ideal. The power and influence that the relationship 
confers upon practitioners should be borne in mind and curbed by them.
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the relationship: particularity, incompleteness and mutuality. 12
Particularity
Caring professionals all require to apply general principles, acquired from their 
knowledge and experience, to unique individuals. The general principles are necessary 
in order to address our understanding that there are universal ways in which people 
should be treated. The application of principles in individual situations is not always 
easy, and demands time and attention - which is not always available in sufficient 
quantities. Doing this can also be threatening, in that people’s responses are 
unpredictable, leading to feelings of loss of control on the part of the professional. But 
if this moral ideal is being aspired to, this challenge cannot be avoided. An example 
may make this clearer. It is a generally accepted principle that telling the truth to 
someone is a moral good; showing respect for the person’s rights to know and to 
make choices based on that knowledge. It may be however that in a particular 
situation, the nurse or doctor decides not to tell the truth at that particular moment, 
judging that it is in the best interests of the patient. Telling the truth may for example 
cause distress which the carer judges that the patient might deal with better at a later 
date. The carer is walking a tightrope: well aware of the results of avoiding truth 
(lack of trust, respect and so on), and with only an estimate of how the patient will 
respond to their actions. This I think is what Campbell means by the threat to the 
professional of treating people as singular individuals: it’s much easier and allows 
actions to be more easily defended if you go by the book.
Incompleteness
Another challenge to the aspiring idealist is the need to acknowledge defects and 
uncertainties in the care being offered to the sufferer. Although technical knowledge 
may be of a high order, the professional’s idea of what constititutes the good is no 
better than any other’s, but she can open up possibilities from their particular stance,
12 I have tried to distil the essence of Campbell’s meaning into a short account: however it 
should be acknowledged that I may in doing so have oversimplified and lost nuances of 
meaning.
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and be open to possibilities which other disciplines, or the patient, are able to open up. 
This notion of the professional’s role accords very well with that of Donald Schon’s 
‘reflective practitioner’, where the professional acknowledges the incompleteness of 
their knowledge, and uncertainty of outcomes: using these as an impetus to learning 
(Schon 1991). It is an aim of current nursing education curricula that reflective 
practice, in Schon’s sense of the word, should be encouraged.
Mutuality
This is defined in the Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991) as “mutuality: of 
....actions/sentiments/relations performed/entertained/possessed by each party towards 
or with regard to the other: the quality or condition of being mutual (reciprocity)”. 
“Reciprocity” is further defined as a “condition which is felt or shared by both parties: 
a mutual action: expressing a mutual relationship”. To “reciprocate” is to “give and 
receive mutually”. 13 Communion of feeling is possible between total strangers 
because human experience and emotional expression are very similar from person to 
person. (Campbell 1984a).
Nursing is physically hard work; the financial rewards, though improved, provide 
little incentive for those anticipating a life long career; the emotional burden can be 
significant; and there can be considerable conflicts arising from nursing’s position in 
the system. However, few, if any, nurses are motivated by entirely selfless reasons. 
According to Campbell, there are potentially great rewards to be obtained from the act 
of caring, in particular the human need to be needed is satisfied. If the right balance 
of mutuality, or interdependence, is struck, the real reward is the personal character of 
the relationship which is created, where each participant is indebted to the other. Often 
nurses claim this indebtedness as ‘job satisfaction’ - a patient expressing relief from 
discomfort, a smile of gratitude, a discharged patient. (Tschudin 1992). Patients often 
express considerable gratitude to nurses (Zaner 1985), and the fact that nurses derive 
great reward from this is illustrated in Marck’s study. (Marck 1990). This 
demonstrated that patients requiring relatively greater effort than others were seen as
13 This is in line with the idea of a covenantal relationship, outlined earlier.
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more rewarding to care for when their condition is improving, or when relatives and 
staff acknowledge nursing efforts. In hospital wards in the relatively dour emotional 
climate of west Scotland, evidence of this interdependence can be seen frequently; 
patients being discharged and their relatives offering hugs, kisses, handshakes and 
small gifts to nursing staff, who clearly take considerable pleasure from these rituals. 
With patients who have been nursed over a long period of time, these mutual bonds 
can be strong. When the bond is disrupted by death, the distress often suffered by 
nurses is evidence that the care has not just been detached provision of a service.
May, in his delineation of covenantal relationships (discussed earlier), emphasises the 
benefits to the carer, who both gives of her skills, and receives the trust of the patient. 
He believes this mutuality nourishes the relationship. (May 1983). Gadow (1980) 
sees the reciprocity of the relationship as the foundation of nursing’s commitment to 
patient dignity. Veatch (1981) believes that moral decision making is enhanced by 
mutuality.
Nurses have been interested in the idea of mutuality, or reciprocity, for some time. 
(Watson 1979, Gadow 1983, Yuen 1986, Fry 1990). A common theme of mutual 
exchange emerges from these writers. (Marck 1990). This ‘mutual’ relationship 
Campbell describes as ‘being there together’. This idea is currently of considerable 
interest in American nursing; the influential theorist Benner in her description of 
nursing classifies a variety of nursing skills under the umbrella term ‘presencing’ - or 
‘being there’. (Benner and Wruberl 1989). Martin Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship has 
also been of interest to nurses, both Tschudin (1992 and 1994) and Gadow (1990) 
deriving their ideas from his work. Gadow goes so far as to claim that the mutuality 
of the nurse-patient relationship becomes the moral foundation of nursing; the nurse 
becoming sensitive to who the patient is as a person, and vice versa. From my own 
experience it is certainly true to say that patients, not invariably but often, consider the 
nurse as a person who happens to be a nurse, rather than the other way around. When 
a true reciprocal relationship exists, patient and nurse share the meanings of their 
experiences, and share control. The patient becomes more effective in coping, the 
nurse in caring. (Marck 1990).
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There are several problems, however, with considering mutuality as a feature of 
professional care. Firstly, the need for reward outlined above can become a demand, 
the nurse seeking to increase a patient’s dependency in order to meet his/her own 
needs, which does not lead to the good for the patient. I am not blind to the fact that I 
chose to spend my own nursing career in ‘life saving’ areas, where the reward 
experienced from the efforts can be immense, for my own personal satisfaction. 
Secondly, if the ideal of care is impossible to meet, for whatever reason, this can lead 
to guilt, and possibly disengagement from the patient, when this ideal is not met. 
(Campbell 1984B). There is considerable empirical evidence to support this latter 
suggestion in nursing: research evidence suggests ‘bum out’ and loss of caring occur 
as a direct result of, among other things, being unable to give ‘ideal’ care.(Duquette et 
al 1994). These will obviously detract from the quality of the reciprocal relationship. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, mutuality, especially as described by Buber, implies 
that both parties are equal. In fact, nurse and patient do not, and cannot, stand in the 
same position for two reasons: one to do with the nature of illness, and the second to 
do with the context of current health care delivery systems, a point which Campbell 
makes. In either case, the vulnerable person is in an unequal relationship in which 
another has control.
Zaner (1985), drawing on Rawlinson and Pellegrino, points out that illness is not 
sought out - it happens. It distorts our ordinary relations with others insofar as it 
debilitates, humiliates, isolates and leaves one at the mercy of others. When one is 
sick, the inequality in the relationship is qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different. 
Mutuality or reciprocity is difficult to visualise in the unequal relationship thus 
described. Does attempting to achieve reciprocity/mutuality therefore provide a way of 
redressing this inequality?
Another aspect of the inequality of the relationship is that often nurses care for people 
who are unconscious, unco-operative, aggressive and so on, and it is well known that 
nurses can find ‘difficult’ patients profoundly unrewarding to nurse. Nurses in this 
position must then make deliberate and conscientious efforts to ensure that these
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patients receive care on a par with other patients. There is evidence that this is often 
not achieved. (Stockwell 1972 and 1984, Kus 1990). Marck (1990) suggests that 
mutuality here might occur through the nurse using imagination and sensitity in the 
light of knowledge and beliefs about the patient. The cultivation of tolerance, and 
appreciation of diversity, might also assist.
It is difficult to talk about nursing as a form of ‘moderated love’ without descending 
into sentiment. Campbell’s work has been of interest to nurses, but has not received 
widespread endorsement. I believe this is for two reasons; firstly, the use of the word 
‘love’ is distrusted because of its associations; and secondly, the theological basis of 
his work has not appealed to a young profession trying to distance itself from its 
religious and military roots. The language he uses is not attractive to nurses trying to 
establish a scientific and professional base for practice. The word ‘love’ carries such 
strong connotations in our society that it is difficult to remember that the Judaeo- 
Christian tradition of ‘love thy neighbour’ is a command which is not mere sentiment, 
but a disposition to act in ways which express respect for persons. In examining 
Campbell’s ideas, I have not pursued a theological theme, believing with Benner that it 
is possible to accept the obligation to others without having to accept an obligation to 
God. An ethic which is detached from a religious context is more acceptable in a 
multicultural activity like nursing than one which is relatively neutral.
Nevertheless, I believe that Campbell’s ideas of what nursing is are consonant with 
the experience of nurses, and that scientific practice requires to rest on a solid moral 
foundation. As he maintains, the effort of caring cannot be described in terms of the 
intellect alone. Campbell, as a theologian, would say that help is given in mysterious 
ways; I, as a nurse, would say that help comes from having a clear sense, both 
intellectual and emotional, of the aims of care and of the person being cared for.
Dialogical Relationship
Bishop and Scudder (1991) point out that a covenant is an agreement between some
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parties which excludes others. They propose a dialogical relationship which is ‘purely 
relational and personal’ (pl9). (A dialogue can be between two or more people). They 
claim that the nurse-patient relationship can be better articulated as a dialogue than as a 
covenant in terms of describing actual nursing experience. In common with a 
covenant, there is mutual trust and understanding (they claim more so than in a 
covenant, which has a greater emphasis on the patient trusting than the carer). They 
outline some problems with the covenantal approach, in that it does not account for 
everyday experience. Often the patient does not display trust or co-operation, and the 
nurse continues to offer appropriate care, despite the lack of this. Often, too, what the 
nurse offers is founded on what the profession, or society, sees as appropriate, and is 
not what the patient actually wants. The nature of the relationship also poses 
problems. It is fluid and changes constantly: patients move from being highly 
dependent to independent - Thompson Melia and Boyd (1994) recognise this and 
suggest that it is appropriate for the nature of the relationship to change from 
covenantal to contractual in different situations. Care is shared - nurses change shifts 
and move from patient to patient - does this mean that the patient forms a covenant 
with each, or is there a sort of blanket covenant? Trust grows as relationships 
develop, it is not always given at the start. This is perhaps a much more likely 
scenario in current health care: MacIntyre (1977) claims that ‘where a community of 
moral and metaphysical beliefs is lacking, trust becomes much more questionable. 
Once cannot rely on others judgements unless one knows what they believe. So one 
cannot accept the moral authority of someone just because of their professional 
position’, (p 210). Bishop and Scudder appear to believe that the dialogue between 
nurse and patient allows this trust to grow: nurse and patient must come to know each 
other personally. They claim that for these reasons a notion of a covenantal 
relationship cannot encompass all nurse-patient transactions; in this I am inclined to 
agree with them.
They offer the idea of a dialogic relationship, under which (I take them to mean) 
special situations in which contracts, codes or covenants are appropriate would be 
subsumed. Whereas a covenant relationship assumes a common purpose, a dialogic 
relationship does not. Each party responds to the other as they are, for example,
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dealing with unco-operative patients. Here the relationship is cultivated and developed, 
not through the establishment of a covenant, but through dialogue between the two 
parties. 14 This dialogue is not confined to the purpose of regaining health, or 
ameliorating distress. Personal conversations also take place. The dialogue may, or 
may not, become a covenant in the course of time. In this discussion, they are 
drawing on Buber’s idea of the ‘1-thou’ relationship, but point out that while for 
Buber dialogue is an end in itself, a caring dialogue entails at least one of the parties 
focusing on the other’s well being.
14 There is some empirical evidence that this 'dialogue' between nurse and patient does 
alter the nurse’s response to moral dilemmas over time (Chally 1990).
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CHAPTER 5: THE POSITION OF THE NURSE
Most of the discussion to this point has focused on the one to one nurse-patient 
relationship. This narrowed focus, although essential to clarify understanding of this 
relationship, is unrealistic. The nurse operates in a hierarchic, institutional setting, 
with an extra duty to the physician.
“Central to understanding the triad of physician-nurse-patient are conflicts and 
tensions engendered by various restraints on power and authority that stem from the 
prevailing hierarchies in health care institutions” (Engelhardt 1985 p 63). Engelhardt, 
a physician, differs from other writers (Oakley 1984; Aroskar 1985) in claiming that 
doctors and nurses share the same views of health and illness, and says that their 
diffferences only turn on their capacities to fashion social reality. The functions of 
diagnosing and prescribing are restricted to physicians - these are the special privileges 
by which physicians restrain trade. He recognises nurses concern for independence 
and special professional integrity, but claims that nursing developed as a profession 
ancillary to medicine. Here he appears to ignore the long standing tradition of women 
as carers in the community, aside from the rise of technical medicine. He also appears 
not to notice the functions of reassurance, comfort and emotional support, and the 
provision of intimate care which many nurses feel to be the core of their practice, and 
therefore denies the existence of a conceptually unique core to nursing. However, 
Engelhardt describes the position of nurses as ‘the people in-between’ physicians, 
patients and institutions, and this is a useful characterisation of the context in which 
nurses work.
The ‘In-Between’ Position
The patient, according to Engelhardt, is the source of authority for health care, and the 
physician is in authority over the provision of health care. Since the nurse is the agent 
of both, ‘caught in the middle’, there is considerable potential for conflict, due to the 
ambiguity of her position. Other writers agree: Winslow and Winslow (1991) claim
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that nurses are often caught in the middle attempting to hold together diverse elements 
of care for the patient whose condition may cause conflict about what is right and 
good. It is not only other groups of people that nurses are caught between. The 
language of care and compassion which is a feature of considerable writing in current 
nursing ethics is a much older one than that of rights and autonomy and nurses seem 
to be caught in the middle of two ways of ethical thinking. According to Lawrence 
and Helm (1987), nurses are caught between hierarchic and paternalistic values and 
feminist doctrines and values. The advent of the latter appears to have muddied the 
waters, rather than offering new scope for thought.
There is some empirical evidence to support the proposition that nurses experience 
considerable conflict resulting from the ‘in-between’ position. Elander et al (1993) 
describe the struggle of nurses to reconcile patients and relatives interests.
International studies (Norberg et al 1980, Akerlund et al 1985, Norberg et al 1994) 
describe the conflicts experienced by nurses in dealing with forcible feeding of the 
demented elderly. Nurses appear to be confused in trying to theoretically decide on 
principle priority. They appear to be willing to abandon previously expressed 
principles either by giving importance to the particular relationship or by 
relinquishing moral authority to others. There is considerable evidence in practice of 
the difficulties faced by nurses referred to by Beauchamp and Childress (1989) as a 
consequence of their position in health care. The barriers to behaving in ways which 
the nurse believes to be ethical are immense, working as they do in an environment 
where actions can be controlled by the threatening of employment security, and less 
obviously, but no less frustratingly, where nurses moral perspectives are not taken 
seriously. The long running saga of Graham Pink (Beardshaw 1982, Vines 1983 and 
Vousden 1985) who challenged the health authority over short staffing detrimental to 
patient care; and the nurses who refused to participate in electro-convulsive therapy, all 
of whom were disciplined and some of whom lost their jobs (Turner 1990, Wright 
1990, Tadd 1991, Jones 1993) are a familiar warning to UK nurses. The cases of 
Tuma and Bardenilla in the USA also carry a salutary warning. These nurses 
challenged physician and institution decisions in the belief that they were acting in the 
patients’ best interests, and suffered considerably in the process of doing so.
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(Johnstone 1989). Bardenilla tellingly remarked that the nursing perspective was 
regarded as inappropriately emotional. Johnstone (p 12-16) also reports the outrage in 
the New Zealand press when it came to light that anaesthetised women were used for 
medical students to practise vaginal and uterine examination, and to insert and remove 
intra-uterine contraceptive devices, without their consent. Nurses in the hospital had 
been unhappy about the practice, and had challenged it through their professional 
association, but had effectively been ignored. One writer has claimed in the light of 
evidence of this nature that nurses simply are not free to be moral, except by personal 
sacrifice. (Evans 1986).
Conventionally, the position is seen as problematic for the nurse - a source of 
considerable conflict. Not all writers are as pessimistic, some see it as an opportunity. 
It is a position unique to nurses, and nurses can exploit it to benefit patients. Winslow 
and Winslow (1991) advocate compromise, rather than rigid adherence to principle. 
They point out that if society claims to be a democratic pluralistic society, negotiation, 
accommodation and concession are implicit within these terms. They suggest that 
hospitals are pluralistic societies where the nurses should see their position as allowing 
them to co-ordinate communal decisions, involving compromise. They define 
compromise as ‘the accommodation of divergent moral positions through a process of 
mutual concessions’. They maintain that compromise is compatible with moral 
integrity if the following conditions are met:
factual and moral complexity is acknowledged
moral language is shared
mutual respect exists on the part of those who differ
recognition exists of limits to compromise
But these conditions are by no means easy to achieve. The scientific orientation of 
health care workers often permits a false sense of certainty: the open expression of 
uncertainty is discouraged. Gilligan’s work referred to previously suggests that there 
are different moral ‘languages’ and that there is a need for people to be aware of these. 
The hierarchical nature of the institution mitigates against people at the top of the
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hierarchy having respect for the opinions of others. The evidence suggests that people 
do draw up limits within which compromise is no longer possible, but unfortunately 
the evidence also suggests that when people cease to compromise, they do so at 
personal risk as discussed above.
It is questionable to as to how far one can see a hospital as a democratic, pluralistic 
society when hierarchies are so embedded in their functioning, and their suggestion 
that nurses take the lead in negotiating compromises is a brave one, but one which 
current power structures make unlikely.
Bishop and Scudder (1991) claim that the position of the nurse is not so much a 
problem as an advantage if the image of the system is cast in the image of a ‘web of 
connection’ rather than a hierarchy of relationships. ‘When relationships are cast in the 
image of hierarchy they appear inherently unstable and morally problematic, but when 
transposed into the image of a web, relationships change from an order of inequality
into a structure of interconnection nurses function to maintain the connections
between patients, physicians and hospitals.” (p 18-19). This connection is required 
for adequate everyday care.
Some nurses resist the notion that the context of the work should be a factor in 
exploring nursing ethics, claiming that concentrating on the in between stance neglects 
the primacy of the nurse patient relationship (Cooper 1988, Gadow 1990). But to 
ignore it is to ignore reality, and ethics is a practical concern.
Invisibility
The medical sociologist Oakley in 15 years of working in hospitals, never noticed 
nurses until she was ill herself, and realised the important contribution made to her 
well being (Oakley 1984). Thomas, a physician/philosopher commenting on 
experiences as a patient in 1983, considered that the institution’s function was enabled 
solely by the nurses - acting as the ‘glue’ which held the whole enterprise together, 
(cited in Winslow and Winslow, 1991). In the complicated web of relationships -
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patients/physicians/relatives/other health care workers/administrators - the nurse is 
often the only individual in contact with all of these. Despite this, the part played by 
the nurses appears to be invisible.
In the USA, the Clinton administration proposed health system reforms have 
generated considerable publicity, in which there has been no mention of the part to be 
played by nurses, despite the fact that nurses are the largest single component of the 
system, and a critical element in reducing in patient days, and therefore costs. 
(Anderson 1993). In the USA, as in the UK, there has been substitution of qualified 
nurses by those less qualified, despite the (limited) evidence available suggesting that 
costs are not necessarily reducedby this strategy, (see Chapter 5).
McWilliam and Wong (1994) carried out an empirical study identifying components of 
the invisible work of nurses in relation to discharging patients, which are all related to 
the work context. According to their research, nurses have considerable work to do in 
relation to bureaucracy, which is hidden from patients. Tasks such as co-ordinating 
the efforts of other health care workers, basing with support depts., and sorting out 
unforeseen problems are all undertaken in order to ensure that patients are cared for. 
Nurses try to compensate for the inadequacy or failure of the system for the benefit of 
the patient. (Winslow and Winslow 1991).This work, often considerable, is taken for 
granted by both nurses and others, and never discussed.
Why should nursing be so invisible? The reasons appear to be partly due to social 
expectations, and partly due to the nature of nursing itself. According to Colliere
(1986), care is viewed as menial work, requiring no particular ability or knowledge, 
and therefore socially and economically unrecognised. A lack of recognition may lead 
to a lack of confidence, and so nurses come to believe that their work requires nothing 
special. Nursing education has traditionally reinforced this; it is only relatively 
recently that colleges of nursing have stopped using texts for nurses written by 
physicians which were in essence simplified versions of medical knowledge as their 
primary texts. Textbooks written by nurses traditionally have been no more than 
guidelines for various technical procedures. Until recently, nurses in general have not
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been required to think in any depth about the nature of their work, and to come to 
believe that it is important.
The public appear to be disinterested in care, showing more interest in those who 
provide dramatic, high-tech cure - as witnessed by the public appetite for 
documentaries on hospital activities. It is difficult to imagine high rating figures for 
programs showing nurses providing for the comfort and needs of say, the elderly 
demented. Hospital documentaries never show the intimate side of nursing work, or 
the activities performed in relation to the function of the nurse holding the system 
together - it just isn’t exciting enough.
Lawler, an Australian sociologist, has conducted research into the hidden work of 
nursing. (Lawler 1991). Her thesis is that nursing is invisible for two reasons: 
firstly, it is thought of as an extension of women’s work, and therefore not worth 
discussing; and secondly, nurses deal with the privatised aspects of the body and 
social life. Often, their work involves body functions, which are taboo, and socially 
unacceptable, and are therefore not discussed or praised. Patients often proudly carry 
home glass jars containing their gallstones for display, and insist on discussing their 
surgery in detail, down to showing off their scars, congratulating the surgeon on his 
handiwork. Very seldom do the same people talk about how their difficulty in 
regaining bowel function was managed by the nurses, or how nurses comforted them 
during periods of emotional disturbance. When they do talk about nurses, it seems to 
be in general terms of their qualities as persons. Wolf (1989) also categorises nursing 
work, and all these categories fit with the ‘invisible’ tag: caring, maintaining the 
system, body work, dirty work and death work. These are all taboo, or taken for 
granted.
The emotional labour, too, of nursing can be invisible. (Smith 1992). For example, 
when a nurse cares for a dying patient, or handles an aggressive one, it is possible to 
measure the physical care, but it is very difficult to establish the amount of emotional 
effort involved.
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Another factor which leads to the invisibility of nursing is the fact that the 
communications which are involved in caring, dealing with the body, and emotional 
support are all verbal, and have not commonly been documented. In general, only 
physical actions are recorded in nursing notes. Nowhere is sitting with the dying, or 
time spent providing emotional support for relatives documented. Even those physical 
actions recorded do not convey any sense of the skills and knowledge required. The 
terse entry ‘colostomy bag changed: technique demonstrated’ hides what may have 
been a protracted and time consuming procedure, where the nurse has had to use 
practical knowledge and skill in changing the bag and teaching the patient, and also 
has provided emotional support and human warmth in an attempt to show respect and 
preserve dignity and self esteem.
Is invisibility a problem? There are good pragmatic and philosophical reasons for 
attempting to make nursing more visible. The functions that nurture, support and 
maintain another’s abilities are hidden, and therefore may not be valued. (Shannon
1991). In today’s econonomic climate, with its emphasis on value for money, nurses 
are for the first time being asked to demonstrate the value of what they do. They have 
found this difficult to articulate. The Royal College of Nursing have published 
anecdotal accounts showing how nursing interventions have improved lives and 
speeded recovery: trying to make the invisible visible. (Royal College of Nursing
1992). There is also research going on into the effectiveness of nursing interventions 
on patients outcome (Bond and Thomas 1992).
Nursing cannot be justified as an important endeavour in practical terms without 
articulating practice; neither can one explore the nature of nursing without articulating 
practice. Those nurses who are engaged in measuring workload and outcomes are 
generally agreed that much of the practice of nursing remains hidden. Many 
dimensions of the work are difficult to address by measurement systems.
(McWilliams and Wong 1994). In this they are in agreement with those who attempt 
to study the nature of nursing. (Benner 1984; Fry 1989).
If nurses fail to recognise the importance of their work, they must accept others
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meanings. Nurses often forfeit recognition for the professional judgement and 
autonomy which they exercise (McWilliams and Wong 1994). The disadvantage of 
this is that they then cannot take steps to examine and improve judgement, and learn 
from failure, if they are not aware of what is happening. Learning and the acceptance 
of open responsibility will then not occur. If actions are based on inexplicated values, 
then nurses are not able to examine and judge these or their derivation. Nor can they 
.learn from events, or pass this learning on. In addition, the invisibility of nursing, 
while preventing good care from being recognised, valued and given credit, will also 
camouflage where nursing intervention has been poor and delayed recovery.
Goodwin et al’s study (1979) demonstrates this point admirably: if nurses are not 
aware of the role of the emotions of anger and discrimination in placebo 
administration, they are unable to recognise and deal with their own feelings of 
inadequacy in these situations, and to see how these govern their actions. They are 
not placed then to act in the patients best interest. The ‘hidden euthanasia’ described 
by Brown and Thompson (1979), because of its invisibility is not amenable to open 
discussion and rational examination. Again, this is not in the patients’ best interests.
Informal Power
Hutchinson (1990) describes how nurses bend rules and what these behaviours mean 
to nurses. The basic social and psychological problem is conflict. The basic process 
chosen to cope with this is subversion. There is often collusion; with the patient or 
with other professionals. The context is revealed as an important factor. Nurses’ 
thinking appears confused; they say they are working to abstract principles, but their 
actions demonstrate that they are responding to particular situations. They claim their 
actions are directed to patient good, and the incidences cited do demonstrate where 
good has been achieved. However, it is difficult to believe that there are no instances 
where subversion has not turned out to be in the patient’s best interest, and 
Hutchinson does not explore this aspect. The hidden nature of the transactions may 
conceal good, but it equally may conceal harm. Lawrence and Helm (1987) also cite
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empirical evidence that manipulating circumstances and using covert strategies is an 
attractive alternative to conflict for nurses.
I have already suggested that a situation where nurses manipulate events, and conceal 
the truth, is an unhealthy one, and have referred to traditional ethics which emphasise 
the importance of truth telling as a moral good. The evidence referred to previously 
suggests that nurses tend to conceal truth from physicians and institutions, and much 
less so from patients. Sometimes there exists a ‘conspiracy’ between nurse and 
patient. Is this a justifiable way in which to behave, given that nurses may feel they 
cannot ‘take on the system’? Sissela Bok makes a case for the ethical justification of 
concealment and secrecy (though not, as far as I can make out, outright lying). (Bok 
1986). Bok is talking about life in general, and not about any one particular group of 
people; but I think much of her thinking is reflected in the way in which nurses act.
Conflicts over secrecy are conflicts over power - the power which comes through 
controlling the flow of information. Nurses are in the ideal position - the ‘in between’ 
position - to enable them to do this. As the people who are in contact with everyone in 
the web of relationships they are have surveillance over all the information which 
flows between them. It is easy to manipulate this flow, as the empirical evidence 
discussed earlier shows. Why do nurses do this? To have no capacity for secrecy is to 
be out of control over how others see you, therefore nurses by pursuing strategies of 
secrecy and deception can control their own identity, and maintain a sense of control 
of the situation. To have no insight into what others conceal is to lack power, so if 
nurses conceal information from physicians, they are in fact curbing their power.
“In seeking some control over secrecy and openness and the power that makes it 
possible, human beings attempt to guard and to promote not only their autonomy but 
ultimately their sanity and survival itself’. (Bok 1986 p 20).
The claims in defense of control over secrecy and openness as justifiable strategies 
are, Bok suggests:
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secrecy protects identity, allows the perception of oneself as unique 
and worthy of respect 
secrecy protects plans/actions, it guards projects requiring prolonged work and 
creativity, it allows negotiation, bargaining, tentative probing - since 
plans may fail if exposed too soon 
secrecy allows people to protect what they own.
In the case of nurses, one can easily see how the first claim is demonstrated: allowing 
a feeling of power in what is an overtly powerless position. One can also clearly see 
the second demonstrated in Brown and Thompson’s study (1979) of nurses delaying 
calling physicians to achieve their intentions of peaceful and dignified death. And it is 
not too far fetched, I believe, to think of the third claim in terms of protection of the 
special relationship between nurse and patient - which offers such clear rewards to 
nurses. As Bok says, the claims may be abused, or overstretched, but they do 
meet fundamental human needs.
There are, as she correctly points out, considerable dangers, as well as benefits to 
secrecy, some of which I have already touched on. Because the nurses in Brown and 
Thompson’s study are keeping their actions quiet, they are not up for discussion and 
they cannot learn from them: feedback and criticism are stifled. Therefore secrecy 
‘debilitates judgement’, in Bok’s words, (p 24). Associated with this, it can conceal 
nurses’ character traits such as callousness; and it can spread and become endemic 
within a community. Reading an account of the recent events leading to the conviction 
of Beverley Allitt (Davies 1993), one is struck by just such an atmosphere of secrecy 
and non-communication in the institution.
If these tactics come to light, the effect on others may be much worse than if nurses 
are openly assertive. The freedom of choice that secrecy gives one person reduces that 
of others. It also demonstrates lack of respect for others: physicians and institutions. 
When they realise this, they often act to control the actions of those who have been 
instrumental in concealing facts, or evading issues.
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So Bok concludes that there can be no presumption in general for or against secrecy 
and concealment (unlike lying). Morreim too argues that real life demands mean that 
we have no option but to be ‘moral artful dodgers’ - that we are morally obliged to be 
ingenious in avoiding conflicts of principles and values. (Morreim 1986 p49).
Jackson (1991) also sees secrecy as different from lying, and we are under no duty 
not to deceive intentionally without lying. Gillon (1993) suggests that the moral 
obligation against even lying is not absolute; it is defensible if pursing the best 
interests of the patients. This then, suggests that nurses may be morally justified in 
their use of secrecy and concealment. However, one cannot escape from the problems 
associated with these strategies outlined above. Nurses may have a moral aim in mind 
- but they must be clear exactly what they are doing and what the dangers are. The 
evidence limited though it is suggests they often do not.
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION
The Role of the Nurse and the Nurse-Patient Relationship
I have examined the roles of handmaiden, advocate, and skilled companion which could be 
fulfilled by the nurse. The evidence seems clear that nurses, by virtue of the nature of the 
system in which they work, often do act as physician assistants, and patient advocates. 
However, this is a feature of the systems in which they work. Integral to the nurse-patient 
relationship itself, however, is the idea of the companion. This stands independently of the 
context: it is possible to see the nurse acting as companion in sickness and distress, regardless 
of the type of system, or whether any system exists at all. I have agreed with Campbell that 
this concept does in fact provide great opportunities for the nurse to achieve the good for the 
patient. Campbell's account of the nature of nursing is unusual but appropriate in that it 
captures those things which set nurses apart from other caring professions: i.e. the physical 
and emotional dimensions of giving nursing care. I have extended Campbell's metaphor to 
include the notion of guide and interpreter, endorsing Zaner's idea of sickness and suffering as 
'alien territory'. Ideally, the nurse has knowledge of the territory, intellectually by virtue of 
theoretical knowledge of life and social sciences, and emotionally by virtue of the exercise of 
imagination and sensitivity, and from having been there before with others. She is equipped 
with the practical skills which enable her to guide and support the patient through the 
experience, and she understands the importance of the physical body and the emotional 
reactions to the experience. It is the patient, however, who has decided where she wishes to 
go, and decides on whether or not to follow the nurse's guidance, or accept her interpretation 
of events.
In describing this conception of the nurse, I am irresistibly reminded of the frontier scouts in 
the American West in the 19th century. These men took on the task of guiding people through 
unknown and potentially dangerous territory. Their qualifications for doing so were intimate 
knowledge of the terrain, and of the potential enemies inhabiting it. It is not difficult to see a 
parallel here consistent with the empirical evidence; nurses know not only the terrain of illness 
and therapy, but also how to negotiate the bureaucratic system in an effort to further their 
patient's interests: Thomas's 'glue' in the system. The frontier scout's sole aim was to see
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their charges safely through the journey. For this they received payment: it was not a 
disinterested seeking after good. In the course of long journeys, and in the face of common 
danger, a temporary but of necessity trusting relationship was formed between scout and 
traveller. I would not care to carry this metaphor too far: there is no parallel to the intimacy 
between nurse and patient requiring body care, which introduces another dimension. The 
nurse is concerned not just to maintain physical safety, but may aspire to maintain the patient’s 
sense of self. The scout's role was also played out within a contractual relationship, and as 
discussed above, this does not fully describe the nurse-patient relationship.
I have said that this role would be valid regardless of the system within which it is carried out. 
The current UK system however is particularly suited for the nurse to function as a guide and 
interpreter, by virtue of her 'in between' position, previously discussed. So I have settled 
upon an extension of Campbell's skilled companion concept as that which most nearly answers 
the research question, and I have tried in previous chapters to show why that is so. I am less 
sure however about the relationship within which this role is played out. It seems clear that a 
contractual relationship does not actually describe what nurses do, nor is it one to which they 
aspire. Neither do patients appear to see the relationship with the nurse as contractual. The 
idea of a covenantal relationship may be one to which nurses might aspire, but I am unsure that 
this accurately describes the nature of the relationship which most patients and nurses 
experience in that, for reasons discussed earlier. There is some evidence which may support 
Bishop and Scudder's description as dialogic in nature (Cooper 1990); and their description is 
compatible with personal clinical experience, but I can find no other writers discussing this 
model. I believe however it holds the potential for further exploration and analysis, outwith 
this dissertation.
Campbell endorses the covenantal relationship as an appropriate model for the caring 
professions, within which the professional offers ‘moderated love’. This appears to be an 
excellent moral ideal for nurses to aspire to in their practice. One of the problems however 
with advocating that nurses aspire to offer 'moderated love' is that there is a grave danger of 
running into the trap of being overly sentimental, and attributing to the nurse a greater 
importance in the patient's life than is really the case. There is also the problem that one has to 
to differentiate what is significant about the injunction to nurses to respect (love) patients in
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relation to the moral injunction laid upon everyone in society to do so. I suggest that in a 
dialogic relationship, the increased vulnerability of the patient draws forth a correspondingly 
increased responsibility to ensure respect (love) is given by the nurse. The expectations of 
society further increase the weight of the moral injunction laid on the profession.
Nursing in Contemporary Society
The fundamental problem for nurses is that their whole reason for being is to care. They are 
however practising in a society where care is not valued. Hewa and Hetherington (1990) 
describe a serious crisis among nurses in the USA, which they attribute to a conflict between 
the underlying values of the nursing profession, and the growing emphasis on a mechanistic 
and value stripped approach to providing health care. Nursing work has lost meaning and been 
devalued. The recent sweeping changes in the UK health care system with its emphasis on the 
market economy have brought us closer to the US model of health care. It is not far fetched to 
see a similar crisis looming among UK nurses. Some writers propose a re-organisation of the 
health services on a broader paradigm, based on the health care needs of people, rather than 
upon the interests of professional groups (Hewa and Hetherington 1990); a pradigm which 
harks back to the older care and environment model from which nursing emerged (Oakley 
1984); a paradigm which is focused more broadly on the social, economic and cultural aspects 
of existence, as well as the purely physical. (Winslow and Winslow 1991). In addition, these 
latter suggest that nurses should concentrate less on the relationship between nurse and patient, 
and that the search for professional identity should concentrate on the elements of the work 
than are linked inextricably to the context, and to the contribution of the disciplines within it. 
This is in accord with the line taken by Yarling and McElmurry (1986), Bishop and Scudder
(1987) and Foulk and Keffer (1991), but rejected by Cooper (1988), Packard and Ferrara
(1988) and Gadow (1983) who place the first emphasis on the nature of the nurse-patient 
relationship. The recent changes in health care, blurring the boundaries between social work 
and health care, is perhaps an indication of the beginning of such a change in paradigm. My 
own view is that the two are inseparable: any account of the moral nature of nursing has to take 
into consideration the relationship between the nurse and the patient, and the context within 
which that relationship proceeds. Sickness and distress will always be with us, and therefore 
there will always be the opportunity for nurses to act as skilled companions: the element of the
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role in holding the system together described above is only relevant in this particular health care 
system. In this context, the two need to be considered as to how these are related to each 
other. This is difficult to do particularly in view of the low visibility of both these elements.
In common with other health care professions, the aim of nurses is to achieve the health and 
welfare of individuals. The particular contributory aims of the nurse are to maintain the 
individual’s sense of self, of dignity and self worth while providing the physical and emotional 
care required to reach this state. I believe that the nurse uses her in-between position to 
organise an environment within which to practise being a skilled companion. The adoption of 
this role I believe serves to best achieve the moral aims of nursing. It allows nurses to channel 
practical skills, intellectual knowledge and reasoning and emotional responses to these ends. 
Clearly, as in any sphere of activity, many will fall short of these ideals. The empirical 
evidence suggests this, but also suggests that many nurses do achieve these aims, in this 
fashion. This of course does not address any problems which arise for the status of the 
profession, the psychological well being of nurses, or the relationship between nursing and 
other health disciplines. Some of these I have discussed in the course of this dissertation.
But there is an idea pervasive in nursing at the moment that seeking an overtly powerful role 
and equal status with other disciplines inevitably is the only way in which to achieve the moral 
aims of nursing. My contention is that there are ways in which this is and can be done already. 
There are very good reasons for the voice of nursing to be heard in public debate, and in 
clinical decision making, but nurses should make these clear and not hide behind the claim that 
only thus can patients' interests be best served.
I have found no evidence that the nature of nursing in essence requires the playing of a
subordinate role. To be a skilled companion, or advocate, within a contractual, covenantal or
dialogic relationship does not require a subordinate position. The subordinate role of nurses
appears to have developed, not from the nature of nursing, but as a consequence of the role of
women in society, and the historical origins of the current day profession.
Implications for Nurses and Nursing Ethics
In order to fulfil a role as interpreter/guide/companion, the nurse requires a considerable
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armoury of skills and knowledge. Scientific and technical skills are taken for granted. What 
has been less emphasised is the need for sensitivity to questions of communication, to the use 
of language in all its forms, to the relationship of body and mind, and to the meaning of human 
experiences. These have all been the concern, not of the sciences, but of the humanities. 
Studying the humanities expands the practical and conceptual imagination, and this may be 
something which leads to social and political change. (MacIntyre 1983). There is a small but 
significant move in nursing away from the heavy emphasis on the sciences toward the 
necessity for nurses to consider the humanities. If this trend continues, with nurses developing 
these skills, Campbell and MacIntyre's concepts of the role of the nurse may become much 
more visible and valued in practice. If nurses continue the very recent trend toward exploring 
the hidden aspects of practice, this may accelerate this development. The danger here of course 
is that nurses may move too far away from the sciences, and therefore lose touch with their 
knowledge of the 'territory' of disease and therapy. A balanced approach is required in order 
to achieve the synthesis discussed above.
The current accounting orientated climate within the health service, plus the increasing costs of 
providing nurses with higher education, and the proportionately high number of nurses within 
the service, has generated a climate within which the cost of qualified nursing care has become 
a significant factor in health care provision planning. 'Skill mix' has become a familiar phrase 
to nurses, and nurses fear the development of a service where the intimate and personal care, 
which has been identified above as a kind of care which is peculiar to nurses, is performed by 
people who are not nurses. 15 The essence of being a companion is to be there; the idea of 
'presence' is an important pre-occupation of nurse philosophers currently. If nurses are 
removed from the bedside to become quasi-managers and accountants, those who take their 
place will in fact be the people seeking to achieve the moral aims of the nurse-patient 
relationship. If the argument that those people require the knowledge and skills outlined above 
is valid, then the direct result of this trend will be that these moral aims will not be met, or at 
least not fully met.
15 This occurs because this care is not seen as valuable, and therefore does not attract significant financial 
reward.
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Health care management is notoriously unimpressed by philosophical speculation and 
argument: but there is some evidence that shows that staffing wards with qualified nurses is 
cost effective (Carr-Hill et al 1992). Nurses are also investigating nursing outcomes with a 
view to providing more evidence of this nature. (Bond and Thomas 1992). It seems clear at 
the moment that this is an appropriate strategy for nurses to adopt in dealing with management. 
The thinking underlying changing working practices, i.e. the development of bank and agency 
staff being employed on a shift to shift basis, clearly is driven by the conception of the nurse as 
a technician within a contractual relationship. It would be ideal if the profession could 
combine empirical investigations of nursing with philosophical thinking about the nature of 
nursing, and demonstrate the relationship between the two. If nurses can clearly articulate the 
essence of nursing, and provide evidence of its effectiveness, then nursing is in a better 
position to argue the case for the presence of the educated nurse at the bedside.
I have not come to any conclusion as to whether nursing has an ethic separate from medicine, 
or indeed from everyday living, but nursing does have distinct values, concerns and challenges 
which deserve consideration. 16 These differences in perspective may not be sufficient, 
however, to establish a completely different ethic. For those nurses who study the nature of 
nursing, and how nurses can attend to patient good, the question is how to reveal these, and to 
consider how these throw light upon the moral foundations of nursing. Benner's work 
provides a signpost. (Benner 1984). By studying the practice of nursing as Benner has, we 
can try to develop an account of the moral frameworks around which nursing has developed, 
and to examine the respective influences of care and principle based ethics. Very little empirical 
research has examined the transactions within the nurse-patient relationship, or the context 
within which this occurs. It is within these relationships, and within this context, however, 
that the moral goals of nursing are, or are not, realised. (Penticuff 1991). Melia (1994) agrees 
here, seeing the task of nursing ethics as explicating everyday practice with the emphasis on the 
patient.
16 That this is not a new development is illustrated by Olson (1993) who describes the separateness of the 
disciplines of medicine and nursing in the early years of this century.
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Schrock in 1980 outlined four fundamental philosophical tasks necessary for advancing 
nursing knowledge by philosophical enquiry: limiting the search for knowledge, thinking 
methodically and systematically about nursing; identifying the philosophical demands of the 
research process and constructing and developing nursing theories. In this dissertation I have 
tried in a very limited way to contribute to the second task. I have seen this work as an 
essential first step in exploring and beginning to clarify the nature of the activity of nursing.
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